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In a year in which the Supreme Court dealt with such hot-button issues as abortion, school
prayer, and Miranda rights, it was a federal district court case dealing with antitrust law (not typically
known for generating public excitement) that garnered the most national attention.
The Justice Department, joined by nineteen states, contends Microsoft has harmed consumers
by stifling competition. Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson agreed, concluding in April that Microsoft
"maintained its monopoly power by anticompetitive means and attempted to monopolize the Web
browser market," thus violating the Sherman Act. In a key point of the decision, Judge Jackson also
found, applying the test set out by the Supreme Court in 1984 (in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v.
Hyde), that Microsoft illegally tied Internet Explorer to its Windows operating system "to quell incipient
competition." As a remedy, Judge Jackson ordered conduct restraints as well as the breakup of
Microsoft into two companies, one of which would make Windows, the other of which would focus on
software applications.
Judge Jackson has sent the case directly to the Supreme Court under the Expediting Act, a
federal law which since 1975 has permitted direct appeals to the Court of antitrust cases brought by the
federal government. The Court will decide this fall whether to hear the case or send it back down to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, a step Microsoft prefers because of a favorable ruling by
that court in a previous, related case. Observers believe the Supreme Court will choose this route in
order to afford the Court of Appeals an opportunity to narrow the issues for its review. Either way,
there is little doubt the Supreme Court will have the final word on the interplay between the antitrust
laws of the nineteenth century and the technology of the twenty-first.
* College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2002.
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IN MICROSOFT CASE, TIPPING SCALES BOTH WAYS
Weight ofIssues Argues for, Against High Court Review
The Washington Post
Tuesday, July 11, 2000
James V Grimaldi
Microsoft Corp. plans to argue later this
month that the Supreme Court should not
accept the direct appeal of its antitrust case
because it is too complex and voluminous. But
the federal judge who sent it there says the case
is too important for the high court to pass up.
In what could turn out to be a pivotal
decision in the case, the Supreme Court is set to
decide this fall whether to review U.S. District
Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson's order that
Microsoft be broken up into two companies or
send the case back to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, where Microsoft
won a 1998 antitrust victory.
"It is my hope and expectation that they
will decide it, without sending it to the Court of
Appeals, for reasons of expedition if nothing
else," Jackson said in an interview with The
Washington Post late last week.
Jackson said a speedy Supreme Court
review is in the best interest of the nation, the
economy and Microsoft.
"I don't think the Supreme Court is any
stranger to voluminous records," Jackson said.
"They've dealt with them before on many and
many an occasion."
But Jackson hastily added: "Once again,
they may be disposed to have the benefit of the
thinking of an appellate court on the subject."
Tom Burt, Microsoft's general counsel for
litigation, said that the Court of Appeals has the
resources, experience and wherewithal to hear
the case and that the Supreme Court should
take advantage of that expertise.
"Clearly the Supreme Court would benefit
from the work that the Court of Appeals could
provide," Burt said. "One [advantage] is
focusing the issues for Supreme Court
consideration so that it doesn't have to deal
with dozens of issues, and secondly the
Supreme Court benefits from the rigorous
application of brainpower. Why would it be in
the public interest to skip that step?"
Jackson, however, sees a less complex
review by the high court. "What they will be
reviewing, I hope, will be a rather discrete set of
factual findings to which I have attached a
similarly discrete conclusions of law, which is in
essence the way they review any case," he said.
The judge said he did not send the case to
the Supreme Court simply to bypass the Court
of Appeals, which overturned his ruling in an
earlier Microsoft case that the company had
violated the terms of a consent decree by tying
its Internet browser to the Windows operating
system.
The appeals court would hear the case
"certainly as fairly and impartially as the
Supreme Court would consider it, if it takes the
case," Jackson said.
Federal law since 1975 has permitted direct
appeals to the Supreme Court of antitrust cases
brought by the federal government. Between
1903 and 1975, antitrust cases went straight
from the trial court to the Supreme Court.
Microsoft intends to argue that the reason
the statute was changed was that the antitrust
cases needlessly tied up Supreme Court time
that should be spent on novel or controversial
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areas of law; the company argues that its appeal
is based on well-established antitrust precedent.
The government is set to argue that if there
is one case of national importance that should
be covered under the law, it is United States of
America vs. Microsoft.
The future of the company and the industry
is at stake. Jackson has ordered the breakup of
Microsoft into one company that makes the
Windows operating system and related
products and another centered on software
applications, such as the Office suite of
programs. The government argues that a
breakup will trigger dynamic competition in the
industry; Microsoft contends it will trigger
chaos.
Jackson issued a set of remedies to tightly
restrain Microsoft's conduct, but when he sent
the case to the Supreme Court he also put a
stay on those business-practice limits. Jackson
said in the interview that Microsoft was entitled
to hear from an appellate tribunal before the
restraints went into effect.
"It seemed to me that it was basic fairness
that before I ordered Microsoft to do
something which was in their judgment
extraordinarily inhibitive of their conduct, that
they were entitled to have a court of appeals
pronounce judgment on what I had done,"
Jackson said.
Imposing a hold on his remedies had
another effect, too, Jackson acknowledged. Had
he left the remedies in place, the appeals courts
would have been in the position of deciding
whether to impose a stay; under that review, the
judges would have had to make a quick
assessment of the case and the remedy before
closely studying his findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
"I am anxious to have them focus on the
merits of the case itself rather than the
magnitude of what will happen to Microsoft,"
Jackson said.
The far-reaching effects of the breakup
order on the company and the economy might
have altered either court's approach to the case.
"I thought it was important for the full court to
consider in the first instance whether any relief
at all was justified, and only then assess the
consequences against the magnitude of the
violations, if any," Jackson said.
Jackson was somewhat restrained in
answering questions, often referring to his
written opinions. "I'm no longer newsworthy,"
Jackson joked at the beginning of the interview.
"My 15 minutes of fame are up."
But he also defended his decision to grant
interviews to several newspapers, a book author
and National Public Radio, saying that a case of
great national importance deserved "some
public exegesis of my thinking on the matter. .
. for anyone who cared to address it to see that
I was doing, in my judgment, the job that I was
called to do. I don't claim any special economic
expertise or special powers of judgment or
discernment which entitle me to undertake to
micromanage or macromanage the industry."
Then, somewhat ruefully, he added: "It was
not one of my options to refrain from
deciding."
Jackson knows that the case remains in his
future. "I'm sure in one form or another it is
going to be back here," he said. "The question
is, what is going to be my charter when it gets
back here."
Copyright D 2000 The Washington Post
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U.S. VS. MICROSOFT: THE OVERVIEW
u.S. Judge Says Microsoft Violated Antitrust Laws with Predatory
Behavior
The New York Times
Tuesday, April 4, 2000
Joel Brinkdey
The Microsoft Corporation violated the
nation's antitrust laws through predatory and
anticompetitive behavior and kept "an
oppressive thumb on the scale of competitive
fortune," a federal judge ruled today.
The judge, Thomas Penfield Jackson of
United States District Court, sided with the
government on the most important points in its
exhaustive antitrust suit, though he surprised
lawyers on both sides by ruling for Microsoft in
one area.
The Justice Department and the 19 states
pressing the suit contended that Microsoft had
hurt consumers by stifling competition in the
software marketplace, particularly at the
expense of the Netscape browser. Judge
Jackson's findings of fact in the case, issued in
November, overwhelmingly supported that
view.
Several experts said today's ruling, applying
the antitrust laws to those findings, laid the
foundation for a powerful remedy. That will be
decided in a separate proceeding to begin
within a few weeks.
Options range from imposing restrictions
on Microsoft's conduct to breaking up the
company. Senior government officials close to
the state and federal officers who are pursuing
the case said many were interested in requesting
a breakup, though no decision had been made.
Microsoft made clear it was set for a long
fight. Its chairman, William H. Gates, said, "We
believe we have a strong case on appeal."
The ruling came just 48 hours after
settlement talks collapsed. On Saturday a court-
appointed mediator announced that despite
four months of mediation and after
consideration of almost 20 drafts of a
settlement offer, the gulf between the two sides
remained unbridgeable.
Judge Jackson issued his judgment at 5
p.m., after the stock markets had closed. But
reacting to the failure of the settlement talks
and in anticipation of the judgment, Microsoft's
stock plunged today, losing almost 14 percent
of its value. That helped fuel a broad decline in
the Nasdaq composite index, which fell 8
percent.
In his 43-page conclusions of law, Judge
Jackson's final judgment on the evidence, the
judge wrote that "the court concludes that
Microsoft maintained its monopoly power by
anticompetitive means and attempted to
monopolize the Web browser market," as well
as "unlawfully tying its Web browser to its
operating system" -- all in violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.
At the same time, the judge ruled that
Microsoft's marketing arrangements with other
companies to promote its Web browser at
Netscape's expense did not have sufficient
effect to violate the law.
Microsoft seemed to take little solace from
prevailing on that point. Mr. Gates did not even
refer to that point when he announced that
Microsoft would appeal.
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"This ruling turns on its head the reality
that consumers know -- that our software has
helped make PC's more accessible and more
affordable to millions," Mr. Gates said.
But Attorney General Janet Reno and other
officials seemed delighted.
"Microsoft has been held accountable for
its illegal conduct by a court of law," the
attorney general said. "We are pleased that the
court agreed with the department that
Microsoft abused its monopoly power, that it
violated the antitrust laws and that it harmed
consumers."
Tom Miller, the attorney general of Iowa,
said, "Judge Jackson's decision is a broad-based
and compelling finding of liability, of law-
breaking." Mr. Miller leads the efforts of the 19
states that are partners with the Justice
Department in the case.
And another plaintiff, Attorney General
Richard A. Blumenthal of Connecticut, said the
remedy should be "as far reaching and
fundamental as Microsoft's abuse of its
monopoly power."
The suit against Microsoft was filed almost
two years ago. It accuses the company of using
a monopoly in personal computer operating
systems to stifle innovation and bully
competitors.
The trial opened in October 1998, and from
the opening moments, the government
presented a case that embarrassed and damaged
Microsoft. Then, when the company offered its
own case several months later, many of
Microsoft's witnesses were humiliated on the
stand.
Testimony ended last spring. And when the
judge issued his findings of fact in November,
he found that Microsoft had "demonstrated
that it will use its prodigious market power and
immense profits to harm any firm that insists
on pursuing initiatives that could intensify
competition against one of Microsoft's core
products."
With those findings, everyone involved
with the case realized that his final judgment --
which would be called a verdict in a criminal
case -- was likely to fall heavily against
Microsoft, as it did today.
Still, many lawyers were less certain that the
judge would find the company in violation of
the provision of the Sherman Act that bears on
combining one product with another.
A central conclusion in the government's
case -- and in the judge's findings of fact -- was
that Microsoft tied its Web browser to the
Windows operating system to gain market share
for its browser and put Netscape at a
disadvantage.
But a finding of fact does not necessarily
lead to a similar conclusion of law, which says
that the action violates antitrust laws. That is
particularly so in this case because a three-judge
panel of the Court of Appeals, overturning an
order by Judge Jackson requiring Microsoft to
offer a version of Windows without the
browser, decided 2 to 1 in 1998 that Microsoft
had every right to tie the browser to the
operating system, if the company could
demonstrate a plausible consumer benefit.
The Court of Appeals judges also
suggested, however, that their opinion might
change once they saw the evidence record from
a trial. Judge Jackson devoted the largest
section of his ruling to defending his judgment
of liability on this count.
The Court of Appeals opinion, he wrote,
"appears to immunize any product design (or at
least software product design) from antitrust
scrutiny, irrespective of its effect upon
competition, if the software developer can
postulate any 'plausible claim' of advantage to
its arrangement of code."
He cited several Supreme Court decisions
that support his view and called them
"indisputably controlling." He concluded:
"Microsoft's decision to tie Internet Explorer to
Windows cannot truly be explained as an
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attempt to benefit consumers and improve the
efficiency of the software market generally, but
rather as part of a larger campaign to quash
innovation that threatened its monopoly
position."
On other counts, he ruled that Microsoft's
campaign against Netscape, as well as its
decision to develop its own version of the Java
programming language and encourage other
companies to use it instead of the authorized
version, prevented Netscape and Java from
competing on the merits.
"Because Microsoft achieved this result
through exclusionary acts that lacked
procompetitive justification," the judge wrote,
"the court deems Microsoft's conduct the
maintenance of monopoly power by
anticompetitive means."
He found in favor of Microsoft on the
charge that the company had tried to block
Netscape from the market by making exclusive
agreements for its browser with computer
companies, online services and Internet service
providers.
Judge Jackson wrote: "The evidence does
not support a finding that these agreements
completely excluded Netscape from any
constituent portion of the worldwide browser
market," as the law requires for a finding of
illegality.
But the heavy weight of the ruling was
against Microsoft, and it included some
extraordinarily damning language in parts.
"Microsoft's anticompetitive actions," he
wrote, "trammeled the competitive process
through which the computer software industry
generally stimulates innovation" to "the
optimum benefit of consumers."
Some experts said the ruling made it likely
that the government would ask for a remedy
that would break up the company.
"It boxes them in," said Robert Litan, a
former senior official in the Justice
Department's antitrust division who dealt with
the department's last suit against Microsoft, in
1994.
In the mediation effort that ended on
Saturday, "Microsoft already made it clear that
they would not accept a conduct remedy"
acceptable to the government, he said. And this
suggests that, if one were imposed, the
government might face difficult enforcement
questions.
"With this strong validation of the case, we
now know that only a breakup will address the
operating system monopoly" that is at the heart
of the case, Mr. Litan said. He is now with the
Brookings Institution and has said he favors
breaking up the company into several
autonomous parts.
This evening, representatives of both
Microsoft and the government said they
remained open to the idea of restarting
settlement talks. But when the judge's decision
was entered, Microsoft's options narrowed
considerably.
Judge Jackson's findings of fact in
November gave plaintiffs' lawyers who were
pursuing private suits against Microsoft useful
ammunition for their cases. But the findings
had only an ambiguous legal standing without
the conclusions of law, entered today.
One of Microsoft's strongest incentives for
reaching a settlement before today was that it
would have removed the threat of a legal ruling
and vacated the findings of fact. But should the
litigants reach a settlement in the weeks or
months ahead, it is not at all clear that the
decision, including its legal conclusion that
Microsoft holds a monopoly in personal
computer operating system, can be wiped from
the records.
"It's an interesting and unsure question,"
said Andrew I. Gavil, a professor of law at
Howard University. "There's no clear precedent
for vacating a ruling after it has been issued."
But even if Judge Jackson were to agree to
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vacate his ruling as a condition of a settlement
agreement, Mr. Gavil noted that other judges
might not feel bound by that.
"Once the ruling is entered, you lose
containment," he said.
Mr. Gavil and other lawyers said they
believed private suits against Microsoft would
multiply.
"It gives powerful new ammunition to
lawyers pursuing class-action cases," said
Stephen Houck, who was the chief lawyer for
the 19 states that filed suit against Microsoft.
He is now in private practice. Mr. Gavil added,
"I think we may well see a new wave of them."
Chart: "'An Unlawful Campaign"'
Judge Jackson ruled that Microsoft violated the
Sherman Antitrust Act in these ways:
The company used anti-competitive means to
maintain a monopoly for its PC operating
system software.
It attempted to monopolize the Web-browser
software market, making a deliberate and
purposeful choice to quell incipient
competition.
It tied its Internet Explorer Web browser to the
Windows operating system as part of a larger
campaign to quash innovation.
The judge ruled in Microsoft's favor on one of
the antitrust charges:
Its marketing contracts with other companies
did not deprive Netscape of the ability to
distribute its Web browser. (pg. Al)
Chart: "The Issues: How Judge Jackson
Ruled"
Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson ruled yesterday
that Microsoft violated the Sherman Antitrust
Act by maintaining its monopoly in PC
operating systems through anticompetitive
means; by attempting to monopolize the Web-
browser market, and by tying its Internet
Explorer Web browser to the company's
Windows operating system. But he did not
agree with the government's claim that
Microsoft's marketing arrangements with other
companies were unlawful exclusionary
contracts. In many ways, yesterday's ruling was
foreshadowed by the findings of fact the judge
released on Nov. 5, 1999. Here are the main
issues and the judge's stance -- then and now.
ISSUE: Monopoly
THE LAW: Companies that hold more than 70
percent of a market are generally regarded as
having monopoly power. A monopoly finding
in the Microsoft case did not necessarily mean
it violated antitrust laws. But a monopoly
finding was an essential first step for the
government, which charged that Microsoft
misused its monopoly power.
JUDGE JACKSON IN NOVEMBER:
"Microsoft enjoys so much power in the market
for Intel-compatible PC operating systems that
if it wished to exercise this power solely in
terms of price, it could charge a price for
Windows substantially above that which could
be charged in a competitive market."
JUDGE JACKSON YESTERDAY: "In
essence, Microsoft mounted a deliberate assault
upon entrepreneurial efforts that, left to rise or
fall on their own merits, could well have
enabled the introduction of competition into
the market for Intel-compatible PC operating
systems."
ISSUE: Attempted collusion
THE LAW: Proving attempted collusion can
require evidence that is uniquely unequivoval,
according to a 1984 federal appeals court ruling.
In the Microsoft case, the government focused
on a June 1995 meeting at which Netscape
contends that Microsoft proposed dividing up
the Web-browser market between Internet
Explorer and Netscape's Navigator.
JUDGE JACKSON IN NOVEMBER:
"Although the discussions ended before
Microsoft was compelled to demarcate precisely
where the boundary between its platform and
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Netscape's applications would lie, it is unclear
whether Netscape's acceptance of Mvficrosoft's
proposal would have left the firm with even the
ability to survive as an independent business."
JUDGE JACKSON YESTERDAY:
"Microsoft's effort to convince Netscape to
stop developing platform-level browsing
software for the 32-bit versions of Windows
was made with full knowledge that Netscape's
acquiescence in this market allocation scheme
would, without more, have left Internet
Explorer with such a large share of browser
usage as to endow Microsoft with de facto
monopoly power in the browser market."
ISSUE: Linking products
THE LAW: The legal precedents are mixed.
Courts have ruled that a good that is produced,
marketed and bought on its own should be
considered a separate product. But in June
1998, in a case related to the larger antitrust
case against Microsoft, a federal appeals court
ruled that Microsoft should be free to blend its
browser into Windows as long as it could make
a plausible claim of business efficiency or
consumer benefit from doing so.
JUDGE JACKSON IN NOVEMBER: "The
preferences of consumers and the responsive
behavior of software firms demonstrate that
Web browsers and operating systems are
separate products."
JUDGE JACKSON YESTERDAY:
"Microsoft's decision to tie Internet Explorer to
Windows cannot truly be explained as an
attempt to benefit consumers and improve the
efficiency of the software market generally, but
rather as part of a larger campaign to quash
innovation that threatened its monopoly
position."
ISSUE: Exclusionary contracts
THE LAW: The precedents provide somewhat
mixed signals. Some decisions suggest that
contracts that exclude rivals from 30 or 40
percent of a market are illegal. But in the Aspen
Skiing case in 1985, the Supreme Court
endorsed a stricter standard if a company has a
powerful monopoly position, ruling that a
contract is illegal if it "unnecessarily excludes or
handicaps competitors."
JUDGE JACKSON IN NOVEMBER: "The
company's dealings with Compaq in 1996 and
1997 demonstrate that Microsoft was willing to
exchange valuable consideration for a PC-
maker's commitment to curtail its distribution
and promotion of Navigator."
JUDGE JACKSON YESTERDAY:
"Notwithstanding the extent to which these
'exclusive' distribution agreements pre-empted
the most efficient channels for Navigator to
achieve browser usage share, however, the
Court concludes that Microsoft's multiple
agreements with distributors did not ultimately
deprive Netscape of the ability to have access
to every PC worldwide to offer an opportunity
to install Navigator."
ISSUE: Predatory pricing
THE LAW: Although it might have been
construed as a monopolistic abuse if the
government could demonstrate that Microsoft
charged exhorbitant prices, the main accusation
was the company unfairly undermined
competitors by not charging enough -- by
melding an Internet browser with the Windows
operating system and giving the browser away.
Other recent legal cases have tended not to find
price-cutting to be illegal unless it can be shown
that the company planned to increase prices
later -- after a rival had been driven from the
market.
JUDGE JACKSON IN NOVEMBER: "Even
if it could be determined that Microsoft charges
less than the profit-maximizing monopoly
price, though, that would not be probative of a
lack of monopoly power, for Microsoft could
be charging what seems like a low short-term
price in order to maximize its profits in the
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future for reasons unrelated to underselling any
incipient competitors."
JUDGE JACKSON YESTERDAY: "Viewing
Microsoft's conduct as a whole also reinforces
the conviction that it was predacious. Microsoft
paid vast sums of money, and renounced many
millions more in lost revenue every year, in
order to induce firms to take actions that would
help enhance Internet Explorer's share of
browser usage at Navigator's expense."
Copyright © 2000 The New York Times
Company
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The judge isn't afraid of the appeals
process; he wants to bring it on.
In the terse opinion filed along with his
June 7 final judgment ordering the breakup of
Microsoft Corp., U.S. District Judge Thomas
Penfield Jackson explained that his swift
decision on remedies was meant, in part, to
jump-start the appeal that Microsoft has
repeatedly vowed it will win.
"It is time to test that assertion," he wrote.
If Microsoft prevails, he added, a prompt
reversal would allow the court "to abort any
remedial measures before they have become
irreversible as a practical matter."
Judge Jackson says that he will approve the
Justice Department's bid for direct review of
the case to the U.S. Supreme Court. Former
solicitor general Walter E. Dellinger III, now a
partner in the Washington, D.C., office of
O'Melveny & Myers L.L.P., predicts that the
justices will take it.
Judge Jackson is bold -- bold enough to
have granted interviews to the Wall Street
journal, the New York Times and the Washington
Post to talk about how he arrived at his decision.
Bold enough to say to the Journal's reporter,
"Were the Japanese allowed to propose the
terms of their surrender?" in response to
Microsoft's complaints that it wasn't given
enough time to argue against the breakup.
He isn't much more tempered in the final
opinion in this historic case. The six-page
document at turns labels Microsoft's assertions
as "not credible," observes that "the company
has proved untrustworthy in the past" and
declares the breakup necessary because
Microsoft's current leadership "is unwilling to
accept the notion that it broke the law."
He cites no cases on the legal standards that
apply to remedies and makes no effort to
explain why the lengthy list of conduct
restrictions will cure the specific violations he
found.
The crux of the appeal
At the end, the judge has let loose. His
June 7 pronouncement -- called a "tirade" by
George Washington University law professor
William E. Kovacic -- will be fodder for
Microsoft's appeal. But the appeal is likely to
hinge on whether the appellate panel agrees
with his April 3 ruling on legal conclusions,
when he took on an earlier victory for
Microsoft written by U.S. Circuit Judge Stephen
Williams, and found it "inconsistent" with
Supreme Court antitrust precedents.
Judge Williams had written that Microsoft's
decisions to integrate new features into its
Windows operating system should be exempt
from scrutiny under antitrust laws if Microsoft
could demonstrate a plausible claim of
consumer benefit. Rejecting this test as too
convenient for defendants, Judge Jackson said
that Judge Williams would have the court view
the market "as the defendant would like to have
the market viewed."
Judge Williams' test for technological tying,
and Judge Jackson's repudiation of it, is the
core issue that will determine whether the
Microsoft case establishes rules of the road for
the New Economy. Judge Jackson found that
you could answer this question by looking to a
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1984 U.S. Supreme Court decision involving
the tying of hospital and anesthesiologists'
services.
His decision all but admits that the rule of
law articulated in that case on tying, which
asked if consumers saw the tied products as
separate, may not be the best one to apply to
the New Economy, but he feels he's stuck with
it: "To the extent that the Supreme Court has
spoken authoritatively on these issues, this
Court is bound to follow its guidance and is not
at liberty to extrapolate a new rule governing
the tying of software products."
Observers who believe the judge made the
right call on tying say that he missed an
opportunity to attack the cutting-edge issue
raised by the case. And critics of his decision
predict that his reasoning won't stand up well
on appeal.
For now, the government is taking pains to
downplay both the tying allegations in its case
and Judge Jackson's war of words with his
colleagues on the appeals court. The
government's case, over 78 days of trial,
introduced a litany of complaints from
Microsoft's partners and competitors.
And the judge found all of that evidence
persuasive. He concluded that the company
had violated Sec. 2 of the Sherman Act, the
mother lode of antitrust violations, with a
pattern of illegal conduct to maintain its
Windows monopoly.
"I think the heart of this case is Sec. 2," said
Joel I. Klein, the Justice Department's antitrust
chief, in a June 8 press briefing. "I think that's
what sustains the remedy in the case, and that's
what the critical legal conclusion is."
Microsoft is just as eager to boil the case
down to the tying claims. "All that's left of this
case is a, I think, a very, very suspect, I will say
unsustainable, technological tie-in case," said
William H. Neukom, the company's general
counsel, at a June 7 press conference.
The government must make strong
arguments on technological tying in order to
prevail on appeal, say some antitrust lawyers.
"The central conduct that was challenged in the
Sec. 2 case was the bundling of Internet
Explorer," says Joseph Kattan, of the
Washington, D.C., office of Los Angeles'
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher L.L.P., who was
Intel Corp.'s lawyer when it faced antitrust
charges from the Federal Trade Commission.
Microsoft's bullying of other companies, among
them IBM Corp., "may appear to be sharp, or
indeed anti-competitive, but may not be linked
to an identifiable harm to competition," he said.
Judge Jackson's decision quotes liberally
from the 1984 high court case, Jefferson Parish
Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2. The
defendant in that case contended it was offering
a single product with a "functionally integrated
package of services," in other words, a single
product. But the Supreme Court held that the
"character of demand" determined whether
there were separate products. Because patients
perceived anesthesiology and hospital services
as separate products, the court found that
packaging them constituted an illegal tie.
Judge Jackson, in findings of fact issued last
November, found that consumers perceive
Web browsers and computer operating systems
as separate products. That "commercial reality"
remains, despite Microsoft's assertions that
Windows is an "integrated" product that adds
functions, often by drawing on the same files of
software code.
The judge recognized that "mechanically"
applying the demand test to software could lead
a court to condemn "genuine improvements to
software."
In Microsoft's case, he found no dilemma.
Its bundling of the Internet Explorer "was the
result of a deliberate and purposeful choice to
quell incipient competition," he wrote.
Mr. Kattan calls the judge's decision "a
copout" because "every decision" to examine
technological design before Judge Jackson's
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ruling has "adopted a test that in a very
substantial measure deferred to product design
decisions." On appeal, Mr. Kattan predicts, a
single paragraph in the judge's fact-findings will
come back to haunt him. In it, the judge found
that the inclusion of Internet Explorer with
Windows at no charge "contributed to
improving the quality of Web browsing
software, lowering its cost, and increasing its
availability, thereby benefitting consumers."
Other observers are less critical. Prof.
Andrew L. Gavil, who teaches antitrust law at
Howard University School of Law, says that
Judge Jackson made the right decision by
finding an illegal tie, although he doesn't think
Jefferson Parish's "separate demand" test works
that well regarding the software industry.
"Ultimately, he doesn't address the deeper,
more difficult decision," Prof. Gavil says.
Conceptually, the test falls short "when you're
talking about software, which literally can be
integrated," he says. Prof. Gavil predicts that
the Jefferson Parish test will evolve.
And what will happen if the tying case fails
on appeal? Judge Jackson has already ruled that
the government failed to prove Microsoft
engaged in yet another antitrust violation --
exclusive dealing -- but that Microsoft's
exclusive deals were part of a Sec. 2 violation.
In a recently published article, Prof. Gavil
contends that if the tying case fails under Sec. 1,
to hold Microsoft liable as a Sec. 2 monopolist
would fly in the face of another 1984 Supreme
Court case that set a higher standard of liability
in Sec. 2 cases.
Prof. Kovacic, the academic who was a
ubiquitous presence at the trial, says that the
appeal's outcome on this issue will draw a line
on illegal behavior for big firms in the New
Economy. At what point do you have a
monopoly "broth" of dominance and conduct,
as one Supreme Court case put it? At oral
arguments, Judge Jackson did not press the
prosecutors to pinpoint just when it was
Microsoft crossed the line. And the
government has crowed that the evidence
against Microsoft is so overwhelming that it
must prevail. The judges reviewing the case
may demand something more exacting.
Copyright C 2000 The New York Law
Publishing Company
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THE MICROSOFT BREAKUP RULING
On Appeal, Firm May Be Able to A void Breakup
Los Angeles Times
Thursday, June 8, 2000
David G. Savage and Davan Maharaj
For the past two years, Microsoft's leaders
and lawyers have responded to every trial
setback by saying they will win on appeal.
They may be right.
The landmark antitrust battle now moves to
appeals courts that are dominated by
conservative, free-market judges who are
openly skeptical of government regulation of
business.
For that reason, most legal experts said
Wednesday that the software giant has a strong
chance of avoiding a forced breakup and may
well win a complete reversal of Judge Thomas
Penfield Jackson's ruling.
Professor Robert H. Lande, an antitrust
expert at the University of Baltimore law
school, said he is no fan of Microsoft but said
the company has reason to be optimistic about
an appeal.
"I think Microsoft should be broken into
four pieces, but I don't think it's going to
happen," Lande said. "I can't believe the
breakup will survive. They government lawyers
will be lucky to win on the findings that there
were antitrust violations."
George Washington University law
professor William E. Kovacic agreed. "They
have a strong chance on appeal. I do not think
the government will run the appellate gantlet
unscathed. In the end, I think they will knock
out enough of the case to avoid a breakup,"
Kovacic said.
Microsoft's appeal is not a slam-dunk.
UCLA law professor John Shepard Wiley Jr.
said the findings are so detailed and exhaustive
that Microsoft will be hard pressed to refute
them. "Microsoft is going to have to be battling
finding by finding," he said. "There are 207
pages of finding of fact, and if you think every
one of them is wrong, the magnitude of
proving that presents a real challenge."
And a partial victory may not be good
enough for Microsoft. If the company is
ultimately judged to have violated the antitrust
laws, that ruling will leave the software maker
vulnerable to private lawsuits filed by its
competitors and its customers.
That's why the company's lawyers will be
pressing hard to win a clear reversal during the
appeals.
"Whichever higher court looks at this thing,
we are confident that we'll succeed on appeal,"
Chairman Bill Gates said at the company's
Redmond, Wash., headquarters.
Grappling With Two Key Issues
Legal experts say appellate judges--and the
U.S. Supreme Court--will have to grapple with
two key issues:
* How aggressively can Microsoft defend
its dominant position? The software maker
used a number of strategies to fend off
challengers, the most important tactic being its
use of exclusive contracts, particularly with
America Online. Wiley, who teaches antitrust
law to federal judges, said that "not only is the
law on exclusive contracts old and vague, but it
certainly doesn't apply or hasn't been applied to
a high-tech context."
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* Was Microsoft's decision to give away its
Internet Explorer browser, and combine it with
its Windows operating system, predatory
conduct or beneficial to consumers? Jackson
ruled that Microsoft's "gift" was not a fair,
competitive tactic and that the only reason
Microsoft set the browser's price at zero was to
kill the competition. Wiley calls the question "a
difficult one because rapid product
improvement and falling product prices is what
happened in this marketplace. Microsoft said,
'See, we helped consumers. They've been the
beneficiaries.' The appeals court will have to
decide."
Under the ordinary rules, the next stop in
this case would be at the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit. Six of its
10 judges are appointees of President Reagan
and President Bush, and it already has sided
with Microsoft on two earlier issues.
In 1997, Jackson barred Microsoft from
forcing computer makers who use its software
to also include its Internet browser.
But the U.S. appeals court took up the
company's appeal and reversed the order on a
2-1 vote. Judge Stephen F. Williams, a Reagan
appointee, said the law should not "thwart
Microsoft's legitimate desire to continue to
integrate products that had been separate."
Judge A. Raymond Randolph, a Bush
appointee, agreed. Dissenting Judge Patricia
Wald, a liberal President Carter appointee, has
since left the court.
Not surprisingly, both the Justice
Department and Jackson would prefer to
bypass the conservative appeals court and take
the case directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.
And a special law governing antitrust appeals
allows just that.
It says if the trial judge believes the case has
a "general public importance," he can
recommend immediate review by the high
court. However, it is up to the justices as to
whether they agree to hear the case or send it
back to the court of appeals.
Justices to Get the Final Word
Most experts who have followed the case
say they think it is more likely than not that the
high court will avoid the dispute--for now.
"There's only a remote possibility the
Supreme Court will take it up now," said
Boston University Law School Dean Ronald A.
Cass. "There's a huge factual record, and the
remedies will be stayed pending the appeals. So,
if you are a Supreme Court justice, why would
you want to get involved now?"
Eventually, of course, the Supreme Court
will have the final word. And it too has its share
of antitrust skeptics. They include Justice
Antonin Scalia, a Reagan appointee who taught
at the University of Chicago, a bastion of free-
market thinking. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, a
Clinton appointee, also has written skeptically
about antitrust law.
"Breyer is no liberal on antitrust," professor
Lande said.
Some legal experts said the company and its
lawyers would be advised to change their
demeanor as the case moves forward.
"I hope they're less arrogant," said Pamela
Samuelson, a UC Berkeley law professor.
"They've really displayed a kind of impatience,
an arrogance with the judicial system that might
even anger the appeals court."
For his part, Gates was not ready to humbly
admit wrongdoing, saying, "our higher-priced
competitors ... have been behind this lawsuit."
Consumers, Gates said, are "just anxious that
we get this up in front of a higher court and get
this behind us so we can continue to do what
we have done throughout our history."
While computer users around the world will
follow the outcome for its impact on their PCs,
antitrust experts will be watching to see
whether the legal rules of the late 19th century
Industrial Age will shape the technology of the
early 21st century.
426
"This is the major antitrust case of the new
Technology Age," Samuelson said. "This is the
case the U.S. Supreme Court will have
something to say about."
Effects Could Be Far-Reaching
And what the justices say in the end could
go far beyond the fate of even the huge
software makers.
"The court will have to revisit the antitrust
legal doctrine that is old and underdeveloped,"
professor Wiley said. "This high-tech world is a
new playing field. No one is sure what the rules
are yet."
WHAT'S AHEAD
For consumers: Not much immediate
impact. New computer buyers may see
different desktop icons, since Microsoft can no
longer control what computer makers put on
the desktop. Also, due to elimination of some
exclusive Microsoft deals with companies, some
Microsoft software, such as Internet Explorer
now required as the default Web browser on
Macintosh, may now be eliminated from some
computers.
In the courtroom: Microsoft will ask the
appellate court to stay the judgement and delay
implementing the business practice restrictions
during the appeal. On a second front, Microsoft
will appeal the decision to the U.S. Appeals
Court. The Justice Department will ask the
Supreme Court to hear the case in an expedited
hearing. The appeals process could take years.
On the business front: The court has given
Microsoft some leeway on what will happen to
the stock. One simple method is to give
stockholders one or more shares in each of the
potential new companies for each share they
now own. Chairman Bill Gates, however,
cannot own stock in both companies.
Copyright © 2000 Times Mirror Company
427
THE NAPSTER CASE
Free Music for Consumers or Illegal Copyright Infringement?
Meredith Lugo*
Like the Microsoft case's potential impact upon antitrust law, the Record Industry Association
of America's suit against Napster may eventually provide the Supreme Court with the opportunity to
update and adapt copyright laws to the Internet.
Napster, the most popular song-sharing site on the Web, provides users access to the online
music collections of other members and free software to download millions of songs, without ever
paying a dime. Consumers, particularly college students, love the site. Major labels and musicians,
however, are not so enamored, and accuse Napster of massive copyright violations. U.S. District Chief
Judge Marilyn Hall Patel issued a preliminary injunction against the company on July 26, 2000 after
concluding that the RIAA was likely to prove their allegations of copyright infringement at trial and that
Napster was likely to cause irreparable harm to the plaintiffs if allowed to remain in operation.
However, a panel of the Ninth Circuit stayed that injunction two days later, citing the novel and
significant issues involved in the case.
Napster contends that its service is analogous to VCRs, capable of noninfringing activities. Patel
rejected this argument, noting that such uses "pale in comparison to what Napster is used for and
intended for." Her ruling reflected the trend among courts in recent years to broadly interpret
intellectual-property rights. However, the decision by a panel of the Ninth Circuit suggests that this
trend may not govern the Internet. The Supreme Court may have the final say.
College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2002.
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NAPSTER RULING'S IMPACT WIDE
Victory Over Music-Sharing Site Extends Beyond Recording Industry
The Washington Post
Fiday, July 28,2000
David Segal and Christopher Stern
With Napster Inc. ordered to shut down at
midnight tonight, the Web's most popular
song-sharing site is on the verge of at least
temporary extinction, leaving millions of fans
hunting for other places offering music for free.
They will find plenty of options scattered all
over the Internet.
But with her swift and bluntly worded
ruling, Judge Marilyn Patel has handed the
recording industry a huge victory, one that
could be easily underestimated, analysts said. By
providing major labels with lethal legal
ammunition and by effectively decimating their
most prominent online competitor, the decision
provides the clearest evidence to date that the
Internet could be an invaluable ally, not an
enemy, of the mainstream record business.
The ruling also suggests that courts are
eager to broadly interpret and vigorously
enforce intellectual-property rights on the Web,
music industry executives said. That's
heartening news not just for the music industry
but also for the television and movie
businesses, both of which fear the Web will
spur upstarts to pirate their content. The
Napster ruling--along with the hostile reception
of various courts to iCraveTV.com and
RecordTV.com--underscore that copyright
holders are finding highly sympathetic
audiences in the judicial system.
And that could have an impact online,
despite the Web's unruly ways. The court action
Wednesday is sure to scare away venture
capitalists who otherwise might have been
tempted to sink money into Napster-like sites,
analysts said.
Few Napster alternatives are as easy to use,
and the less convenient they are, the more likely
it is that they will fail to catch on beyond the
hard-core college students who have the time,
inclination and know-how to decipher them.
"This decision says that the labels are going
to have a major say in how downloadable music
evolves," said Gene Hoffman, chief executive
of EMusic.com, which has struck deals with
independent labels to sell music online. "The
downloadable music world will have to deal
with the reality of how the music business
works, which means labels and artists will have
to get paid."
Judge Patel's injunction covers only
copyrighted material, but Napster's attorneys
said there is no way to filter out the protected
from unprotected material, which means
Napster will be forced to unplug itself. The
company yesterday asked the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 9th Circuit for an emergency
stay of the injunction.
Of course, the downloadable-music party,
as plenty of livid Web surfers noted yesterday,
won't end because a judge in San Francisco
decides it's over. Napster's ultimate fate--and
the fate of all free music sites--has yet to be
determined.
Napster officials did not return a call
yesterday. But some Net executives contend
that the recording industry has merely won
itself a few months of breathing time, a
moment in which they can begin offering a
viable, legal alternative to pirated-music sites,
which are even now being flooded with traffic.
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So far, the major labels have been reluctant to
move their content online, worried about
irritating retailers and fearing that the songs will
be downloaded and mass-copied.
"The labels will soon have to offer
something as flexible and convenient as
Napster," said Rob Glaser, chief executive of
RealNetworks. "What they've got is a
bootlegging problem and the only way to end it
is to end prohibition."
As of tomorrow, none of that bootlegging
will occur at Napster, the tiny Redwood City,
Calif., company that became an Internet
superstar in less than a year. The site gives Web
users access to the online music collections of
other members, a library that quickly soared to
the tens of millions. With a mere 45 employees
and barely a dollar in promotions, Napster has
become one of the Web's most visited
destinations.
That delighted the 23 million people who
signed up for the service and downloaded
thousands of songs without forking over a
nickel. But Napster appalled the major labels,
many artists and the Record Industry
Association of America, which sued the
company, accusing it of massive copyright
violations.
The outcome of that suit will ultimately be
determined at a trial, likely to unfold early next
year.
But Judge Patel's ruling and her curt
dismissal of every one of Napster's arguments
leaves little mystery about her inclinations. On
Wednesday, she invited Napster attorney
Daniel Johnson to "take a seat" shortly after
explaining to him why the Audio Home
Recording Act of 1992--which provides
immunity to noncommercial copying of sound
recordings--doesn't offer the company any
protections.
"We live in the age of intellectual property,"
said copyright lawyer Mark Fischer of Boston's
Palmer & Dodge. "You're seeing a trend in the
courts to interpret intellectual-property rights
broadly."
With Napster set to unplug itself at
midnight, traffic on the site reached an all-time
high, a public relations official there said. Users
were either foraging through the site or stewing
about its imminent coma.
"These guys are just money-hungry," fumed
Edgar Daza, 28, of Fairfax, referring to the
record industry.
Meanwhile, Napster imitators struggled to
prepare for an incoming flood. Tel Aviv-based
iMesh.com is busy upgrading itself. Less than
24 hours after the Napster ruling, iMesh was
already logging a 10 percent to 15 percent
increase in users, according to Uri Roshstein,
vice president of research and development.
The Web site has the capacity to handle 50,000
users simultaneously, but it is enhancing its
hardware for up to 200,000 visitors at once.
The big question is whether this, or any
other swapping sites, are ready for prime time.
Many of them are built on Gnutella software, a
technology that is far harder to snuff out
through the courts--its decentralized
architecture can be sustained by its users,
without the help of a company, which can
always be sued.
But Gnutella software clogs more easily
than Napster's, said experts, and it's less user-
friendly. The Gnutella-based sites that are
easiest to find and navigate are sites such as
Zeropaid.com, which is a company, even if it is
run by a relatively penniless Jorge Gonzalez.
"What are they going to do, sue me, a 24 -year-
old Web designer?" Gonzalez asked.
They might, at least if Zeropaid.com ever
catches on. The RIAA's legal strategy isn't to
eradicate the pirated-music business but to
contain it to levels that will allow labels to turn
profits, officials there say. The problem with
Napster, according to some analysts, wasn't that
it hurt the music business--many independent
surveys found that the service actually boosted
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record sales for the same reason that radio has
been a godsend to the labels.
Napster, however, threatens the grip that
the labels now have on the distribution and
marketing of music. It could have--and might
still--become an alternate route for artists to sell
their songs, especially if it ever met current
projections that its user base would eventually
grow to 70 million. Were the company to figure
out a way to capitalize on its popularity, it could
become a brand name that eventually rivals
Sony, for instance, and appeal to artists fed up
with their labels.
"Major labels don't have images these days,
but Napster does," said Ric Dube, an analyst at
Webnoize, an online market research firm. "If I
was an artist and I was thinking that my old-
world label didn't understand the new media
world and I was looking for a new place to
distribute, Napster is one place I'd consider."
For now, however, the labels have scored
an impressive opening salvo in their campaign
against pirated music, and they now have an
opportunity to consolidate their strength and
get their own act online unhindered by a pesky
upstart. The Internet was supposed to savage
the labels. Instead, it's shaping up as a realm
that is generating scads of cash and over which
the record business is exercising surprising
control.
"Copyright owners," said EMusic's
Hoffman, "are alive and well."
The Napster Difference
Until now, technology really hadn't changed
the way consumers obtain music: The artist
records it, the record company produces the
tapes and CDs, and then they're distributed to
stores and music clubs, where the customer
buys them -- more than $ 13 billion worth in






But now, Napster -- a service that allows
users to browse through files held by other
users -- makes it easy for computer-using music
enthusiasts to pick up sound files of their
favorite songs over the Internet. The Recording
Industry Association of America says that
Napster has hurt music sales near college
campuses, where the software is popular *
but Jupiter Communications, an Internet
commerce research firm, says Napster users
actually tend to buy more recorded music than
non-users.
First-quarter store sales of music, in
millions of units





SOURCES: Recording Industry Association
of America; court documents; Jupiter
Communications
Copyright C 2000 The Washington Post
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Napster is battling to keep its music-
swapping service online past midnight tonight.
A day after U.S. District Chief Judge
Marilyn Hall Patel issued a preliminary
injunction against the San Mateo-based
company, Napster's attorneys Thursday sought
an emergency stay of the injunction from the
Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals. They are
also seeking an expedited schedule to appeal
the order.
"We think there are serious questions in
this area of law," said Daniel Johnson Jr., a
partner at Fenwick & West and one of the
attorneys representing Napster. "A lot of the
issues are issues of first impression."
On Wednesday, Patel granted a request for
an injunction against Napster -- a move that
will effectively shut down the Web site through
the course of a copyright infringement suit
brought against Napster by the recording
industry. The order takes effect at midnight
tonight.
Patel concluded that record labels and
music composers were likely to prove at trial
that Napster's service is infringing their
copyrighted works. She also found that
Napster's continued operation is likely to cause
irreparable harm to the plaintiffs.
While Napster attorneys are banking on a
more favorable reading of their case by the
Ninth Circuit, many attorneys believe Patel's
reasoning is bullet- proof.
"The only court that could interpret federal
statute in the aggressive way Napster wants
would be the Supreme Court, and even then I
doubt it," said Ira Rothken, a San Rafael solo
practitioner who is representing MP3Board Inc.
in a dispute with the Recording Industry
Association of America.
Copyright attorney Mark Radcliffe, a
partner at Gray Cary Ware & Freidentich, also
believes Napster will lose on appeal. Patel "was
quite careful to find facts in a way that would
make it difficult for them to get her ruling
overturned," Radcliffe said. For example, he
said she explained the credibility of plaintiffs'
survey that CD sales were hurt by Napster and
why Napster's noninfringing uses were not
substantial.
Napster's Web site provides free software
that allows visitors to the site to exchange MP3
music files with each other over Napster's
servers. Last December the RIAA and several
record labels filed suit against Napster. In A&M
Records Inc. v. Napster Inc., 99-5183, they
charge Napster with contributory and vicarious
copyright infringement.
A similar suit was filed by a group of music
composers in April. That case, Leiber v.
Napster, 00-0074, is being heard in tandem
with RIAA's suit.
Patel heard arguments from attorneys on
both sides before issuing an injunction. In a
lengthy explanation of her decision, Patel took
apart Napster's arguments of "fair use" under
the 1984 Sony Betamax case and right of
consumers to "noncommercial" copying of
music under the Audio Home Recording Act of
1992.
In the Betamax ruling, the Supreme Court
found that videocassette recorders could be
marketed because they were capable of
substantial non-infringing uses. Napster
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attorney David Boies said that like VCRs,
Napster's service is capable of noninfringing
activities and thus is "not guilty of contributory
infringement."
For Patel, the number of people swapping
music over Napster's system belies the fair-use
argument. When Boies said that 80 percent to
90 percent of works copied by Sony's Betamax
were copyrighted, Patel rejoined that viewers
"weren't sharing it with the world."
Patel further concluded that the non-
infringing uses of Napster's service " pale by
comparison to what Napster is used for and
intended for." Further, she said "a host user
sending files cannot be said to engage in
personal use."
Napster attorneys also argued that Napster
is covered under the federal Audio Home
Recording Act. They said that in RIAA v.
Diamond Multimedia Systems Inc., 180F.3d
1072, the Ninth Circuit found that the law
protected all noncommercial copying by
consumers of digital and analog musical
recordings. But Patel disagreed. She said the
court stated that neither computers nor hard
drives are digital audio recording devices.
Patel also concluded that the millions of
people swapping music over Napster's system
were causing irreparable harm to the record
labels and music publishers. She cited evidence
that Napster had reduced CD sales and made it
difficult for record companies to enter the
digital download market.
In their appeal brief, Napster attorneys
argue that Patel's decision conflicts with prior
court decisions and is "contrary to principles
articulated in controlling Supreme Court
precedent." Specifically, they say Patel
misinterpreted the Sony decision.
The brief also says Patel's "draconian
order" will force Napster to close its service
and lay off approximately 40 employees.
"Because the peer-to-peer architecture of
Napster makes it impossible for Napster to
monitor and control what its users share, the
injunction in necessary effect required Napster
to block the sharing of all music files despite
the uncontradicted evidence that a significant
amount of music copying by Napster does not
infringe any copyright," the brief states.
The brief also responds to Patel's remark
that Napster "created the monster" and must
develop software that prevents users from
downloading copyrighted material.
In its brief, Napster said "this would
require Napster to compile a database of
millions of artist and band names, and then to
compare every user's search request against that
list, attempting to exclude any file name
contained on the 'off-limits' database, all within
48 hours. The sheer burden this would impose
on the Napster system would preclude its
operation."
The plaintiffs' attorneys must respond to
the appeal by 9 a.m. on Friday. They said they
are confident that the Ninth Circuit will uphold
the injunction.
"Patel's ruling was powerful and well
reasoned," said Jeffrey Knowles, a partner in
San Francisco's Coblentz, Patch, Duffy & Bass
and one of the attorneys representing music
publishers. "There is no reason for the Ninth
Circuit to overturn the decision in the long
term."




Unconstitutional GovernmentalAdvancement ofReligion or Better Educational Opportunities
for All Children?
Meredith Lugo*
In recent years vouchers have come to be seen by some as the solution to America's declining
test scores and failing schools. Others believe voucher programs unconstitutionally funnel money into
religious schools in violation of the First Amendment and drain much-needed resources from
struggling public schools. The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the issue. A Cleveland program may
provide the Court with an ideal test case. In what has been called the "lengthiest, most well-reasoned
opinion on [the] issue from any court in the last five or six years," U.S. District Court Judge Solomon
Oliver Jr. ruled on December 20, 1999 that the program violated the separation of church and state,
noting that 82% of the schools involved in the program are religiously affiliated and that the state has
done nothing to ensure that the money distributed to the schools was used only for nonreligious
educational purposes.
Judge Oliver emphasized: "Since there are very few nonreligious options for eligible students,
one also cannot say that the decision to attend a religious school under the voucher program was made
as a result of the genuinely independent choice of aid recipients. Thus, the program has the effect of
advancing religion through government-supported religious indoctrination." Voucher advocates
counter that the voucher program merely allows parents to choose where their children attend school,
and make private schools that otherwise would be out of their reach accessible to lower-income
families. The case is currently in the hands of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
and could reach the Supreme Court in the 2001-2002 term.
If it does, the justices will be guided by their recent decision in Mitchell v. Helms, in which they
voted 6-3 to uphold federal aid to parochial schools to purchase computers and other educational
materials. Writing for four justices, Justice Clarence Thomas declared that no forbidden religious
purpose could be attributed to the government if it "offers aid on the same terms, without regard to
religion" to all schools. He emphasized this was particularly true when individual choices governed how
the aid was used, seeming to signal support for vouchers, which consist of money given to parents, not
directly to the schools. The three justices in dissent conceded as much, warning that Justice Thomas'
opinion "foreshadows the approval of direct monetary subsidies to religious organizations, even when
they use the money to advance their religious objectives."
The future of vouchers, like so many constitutional issues, seems to lie in the hands of Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor. While concurring in the Mitchell result, she wrote a separate opinion, joined by
Justice Breyer, to emphasize that her approval of the loan program was conditioned on the fact that
none of the money under it "reached the coffers of religious schools" and to signal her break with
Justice Thomas' logic, which she called "troubling". Thus, the outcome in a future voucher case
remains unclear.
* College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2002.
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VOUCHERS VIOLATE U.S. CONSTITUTION, JUDGE RULES
Ohio School Program To Go On During Appeals
The Cincinnati Enquirer
Tuesday, December 21, 1999
Michael Hawthorne
Billed as a way to escape Cleveland's failing
public schools, Ohio's taxpayer-funded voucher
program ended up promoting "religious
indoctrination" in violation of the constitutional
separation of church and state, a federal judge
ruled Monday.
The ruling by U.S. District Judge Solomon
Oliver Jr., based in Cleveland, puts proponents
and opponents of taxpayer support for private
schools on course for a showdown in the U.S.
Supreme Court, which appears ready to make
the Ohio program a test case.
Judge Oliver delayed enforcement of his
decision while the state appeals to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit in
Cincinnati. As a result, children participating in
the 4-year-old program won't have to leave
their schools.
Conservative groups, the Catholic Church
and other religious organizations have pushed
to expand vouchers throughout the country.
Ohio lawmakers so far have limited the
program to Cleveland, where 3,543 students in
kindergarten through sixth grade receive up to
$ 2,500 each in tuition assistance.
Unlike other forms of taxpayer funding
provided to private and religious schools, Judge
Oliver wrote, the state has made no attempt to
ensure the vouchers are used only for
nonreligious educational purposes.
Of the 56 schools involved in the program,
46 of them - 82 percent - are religiously
affiliated.
"Since there are very few nonreligious
options for eligible students, one also cannot
say that the decision to attend a religious school
under the voucher program was made as a
result of the genuinely independent choice of
aid recipients," Judge Oliver wrote. "Thus, the
program has the effect of advancing religion
through government-supported religious
indoctrination."
Activists on both sides of the debate
weren't surprised. Just before school started in
August, Judge Oliver ruled the program
appeared to have the "primary effect of
advancing religion." His decision to block new
students from entering the program later was
overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court, which
ruled the program could continue while lower
courts consider it.
Voucher proponents contend the program
gives parents choices other than public schools.
They note the nation's top court has ruled some
other forms of taxpayer assistance to religious
schools are constitutional.
"The continuity of the program is crucial to
these children, their families and to the state's
ongoing evaluation of scholarship (voucher)
programs as viable school-choice alternatives,"
Attorney General Betty Montgomery said in a
prepared statement.
Senate President Richard Finan, R-
Evendale, and House Speaker Jo Ann
Davidson, R-Reynoldsburg, issued their own
joint statement vowing the state would
"aggressively pursue an appeal" of Judge
Oliver's decision.
Most of Judge Oliver's 61-page opinion
(available over the Internet at
www.ohnd.uscourts.gov) reviewed the
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Cleveland program through the prism of
previous rulings related to public support for
private education.
He made his position clear by citing
excerpts from the parent handbook at one of
the Catholic schools participating in the
voucher program. No. 1 on the school's list of
educational objectives is to "communicate the
gospel message of Jesus."
Students at another voucher school are
expected to "contribute a nominal amount for
membership in the Society for the Propagation
of the Faith."
A ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court on
Ohio's program could provide guidance as
interest groups, educators and parents debate
vouchers and the future of public education.
Legislation has been introduced in
Congress to create a national voucher program.
Legislatures in about half the states have
considered similar programs.
Previous rulings from the nation's high
court have been inconclusive.
For instance, the justices let stand
Milwaukee's voucher program last year by
refusing to review a case challenging it. In
another decision handed down earlier this
month, the court allowed Maine to keep
providing tuition vouchers to children who
attend some private schools while denying
assistance for those in religious schools.
Barry Lynn, executive director in
Washington of Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, called Judge
Oliver's ruling "a powerful rebuke to those who
believe the government can force taxpayers to
support churches or church schools."
But Clint Bolick, litigation director for the
Washington, D.C.-based Institute for Justice, a
law firm that promotes school choice, predicted
the Oliver ruling "will be a very short-lived
decision. If the Court of Appeals will not
overturn the decision, we feel very confident
that the U.S. Supreme Court will uphold the
program."
Kevin Barclay, who has his 7-year-old
daughter, Alexis, and 8-year-old daughter,
Alayna, enrolled through the voucher program
at St. Mary's, a Catholic school, was dismayed.
"The issue is still a matter of choice,
although I can understand his point of view,"
said Mr. Barclay, who is not Catholic. "The
curriculum is so advanced, as well as values and
morals that my daughters get there." The
Associated Press contributed to this report.
Copyright Q 1999 The Cincinnati Enquirer
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CLEVELAND VOUCHERS MAY GET SUPREME REVIEW
Albuquerque Tribune
Monday, December 27, 1999
Rachel Smolkin, Scipps Howard News Service
WASHINGTON A Cleveland school-
voucher program ruled unconstitutional by a
-federal judge would make a good test case for
the U.S. Supreme Court, attorneys on both
sides agree.
U.S. District Judge Solomon Oliver last
Monday threw out Ohio's taxpayer-funded
program for Cleveland children to attend
private or religious schools.
The issue of vouchers has become a hot
legislative topic in New Mexico, with Gov.
Gary Johnson determined to bring it up again
in the session starting Jan. 18. Johnson's
voucher advocacy fired debate during the 1999
session and ultimately went down to defeat.
"There is a very good likelihood that the
Supreme Court would see this as the test case
and grant review," said Bob Chanin, general
counsel for the National Education Association
and lead attorney for the anti-voucher side.
Oliver ruled the voucher program violated
the Constitution's separation of church and
state, noting 82 percent of schools participating
in the program are church-affiliated.
Early in the school year in Cleveland a
judge issued a temporary ruling against the
voucher program, leaving parents whose
children were in voucher-supported schools
scrambling for classroom spots in which to put
their children.
Oliver's decision, making the earlier
temporary order permanent, said the program
"has the effect of advancing religion through
government-supported religious indoctrination.
. . . Because of the overwhelmingly large
number of religious versus nonreligious schools
participating in the voucher program,
beneficiaries cannot make a genuine,
independent choice of what school to attend."
Voucher advocates, including many
conservatives and religious groups, view them
as a way to expand school options for poor
children and argue that increased competition
for students will spur public school
improvement. Ohio lawmakers established
Cleveland's voucher program in 1995 as an
alternative to the city's struggling public
schools. It allows up to $2,500 per year in
tuition aid for each student from kindergarten
through sixth grade.
Opponents, including teachers unions and
civil-liberties groups, contend vouchers blur the
division between church and state, and drain
valuable resources from public education.
The Cleveland case is now headed for the
6th Circuit Court of Appeals in Cincinnati,
where attorneys hope to see a decision by the
end of the school year.
Whichever side loses will likely ask the U.S.
Supreme Court to hear the case. The Supreme
Court has rejected review of at least five
voucher and voucher-related cases in the last
two years.
But Chanin said this case presents the
voucher issue in straightforward terms. The
critical facts, such as the types of schools
participating in the program, are not in dispute.
He also called the judge's ruling the "lengthiest,
most well-reasoned opinion on this issue from
any court in the last five or six years."
Clint Bolick, litigation director for the
Institute for Justice, a Washington group that
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helped defend the Cleveland program,
expressed confidence his side will win its
appeal. "If not, this case certainly looks like a
good candidate for the U.S. Supreme Court,"
he said.
Bolick described the Cleveland case as a
"prototypical" voucher program focused on
inner city schools and poor children.
He cited the Supreme Court's earlier
intervention as a good sign it may agree
ultimately to take the case. In November, the
Supreme Court allowed the voucher program
to remain in place until the appeals court rules,
lifting Oliver's earlier ruling that new students
could not enter the program.
Bolick said Oliver's ruling against vouchers
is in clear conflict with pro-voucher rulings by
the Wisconsin, Ohio and Arizona supreme
courts. The Ohio Supreme Court had ruled
against Cleveland's voucher program on a
technicality but said it did not violate the
separation of church and state.
The Vermont and Maine supreme courts, as
well as the 1st Circuit Court of Appeals in
Boston, have ruled taxpayers cannot be forced
to pay religious-school tuition.
"If his (Oliver's) decision is sustained on
appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court would be hard
put to avoid deciding the controversy,
particularly given that 4,000 kids' educational
futures are at stake," Bolick said.
But Mark Tushnet, a constitutional law
professor at Georgetown University, said the
Supreme Court may not view the various court
rulings as conflicting because of differences in
the voucher programs. "In this area, slight
variations in facts make a significant difference"
in constitutionality, he said.
Tushnet said the Supreme Court probably
would only take the Cleveland case if the
appeals court confirms Oliver's decision.
"Justices takexyuch more seriously decisions
that restrict states in what they do than
decisions upholding states in what they do," he
said.
Bolick and his colleagues could encourage
the Supreme Court to hear the case even if they
win on appeal, a tact they took after victories in
Arizona and Wisconsin. "We do not at all fear a
Supreme Court case," Bolick said. "To the
contrary, we would really love to have the
constitutional cloud removed once and for all."
If the Supreme Court takes the case, it
could go before the justices in a year and a half
to two years.
Copyright D 1999 Albuquerque Tribune
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RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE
Meredith Lugo*
Vouchers are not the only hot topic involving religion and government. Two other key disputes
in courtrooms this year concern the Ten Commandments and state and national mottos. Some see the
posting of both as the solution to the nation's declining morality; others view them as an impermissible
governmental endorsement of religion.
Federal judges recently blocked the erection of monuments bearing the Ten Commandments
from the Statehouse lawn in Indiana and the Capitol lawn in Kentucky. Supporters of the monuments
argue that they do not endorse religion, and instead emphasize the historical importance of the
Commandments as an influence upon the American system of justice. However, the American Civil
Liberties Union contends the monuments represent state endorsement of a particular religion. They
argue that the monuments are clearly motivated by a religious purpose upon which the government
may not base its actions.
The national motto, "In God We Trust," has also become a point of contention in recent
months. Both the United States House of Representatives and the Colorado State Board of Education
have, respectively, urged display of the motto in public buildings throughout the nation and public
schools in Colorado. Representative Bob Schaffer of Colorado introduced the measure in Congress,
arguing it was not an endorsement of religion but merely an affirmation of a belief in a supreme being.
Proponents of the Colorado resolution contend it gives schools the ability to reinforce moral precepts.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is currently evaluating the constitutionality of
Ohio's state motto, "With God All Things Are Possible," after a panel struck down the motto in April
as an unconstitutional endorsement of the Christian religion. The full United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit has agreed to rehear the case later this year.
As religion increasingly encroaches upon both schools and federal buildings, in the form not
only of the Ten Commandments and mottos, but also moments of silence and school prayer, it seems
certain the Supreme Court will soon once again be drawn into the debate.
* College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2002.
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STATEHOUSE CAN'T POST BIBLE LAWS
Governor May Appeal Judge's Injunction, Says Con2mandments' Display as a Historical Text
is Legal. Indiana Civil Liberties Union Attorney Ken Falk Says His Group's Lawsuit is Not an
Attack on Rehgion.
The Indianapols Star
Saturday, July 29, 2000
R. Joseph Gelarden
Thou shalt not display the Ten
Commandments on the Statehouse lawn, at
least not yet, a federal judge told Gov. Frank
O'Bannon on Friday.
A temporary injunction issued by U.S.
District Judge Sarah Evans Barker bars the state
from erecting a 7-foot limestone monument
bearing the biblical laws, as well as the Bill of
Rights and the preamble to the U.S.
Constitution.
The order is to remain in effect until the
courts resolve a lawsuit filed by the Indiana
Civil Liberties Union that claims raising the
monument would violate the U.S. Constitution
by representing the establishment of religion by
the state.
Barker's order offered at least a preliminary
endorsement of that claim.
"We conclude that a reasonable person
looking at this monument would undoubtedly
view it as an endorsement of religion," she
wrote in a 39-page opinion.
The debate over the monument in Indiana
this year came amid a nationwide push to
display the commandments in public places.
Supporters say the United States based its
system of laws on the 10 rules that the biblical
Book of Exodus says God gave to Moses.
In a hearing on the injunction earlier this
week, attorneys for the state had argued that
the display was proper because it would remind
the people of some of the nation's core values.
A spokesman said O'Bannon will confer
with lawyers before deciding whether to appeal
Barker's ruling.
During the last legislative session,
O'Bannon signed into law a bill that allows
schools and governments to post the
commandments in their buildings if they are
displayed with other historical documents. That
law went into effect July 1.
"The governor continues to believe that the
proposed display in its historical context is
constitutional," said O'Bannon press secretary
Phil Bremen.
"He believes that that is the in tent of the
legislature when it passed the law (permitting
the display of the commandments) this year."
ICLU lawyer Ken Falk said the Barker
ruling recognizes his group's claim.
"First, the court recognizes the proposed
monument is motivated by a religious purpose,"
he said. "Second, the court recognizes (that the
display) would have the appearance of
endorsing a particular religious belief by the
state."
Falk said the suit was not an attack on
religion.
"This case is not about the Ten
Commandments," he said. "They are truly holy
ideas from a truly holy text. If you accept (the
commandments) as part of your religious belief,
it is clear the government should not endorse it
or put it on state property."
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The question already is pending before a
federal appeals court in Chicago.
In May, judges of the 7th Circuit Court of
Appeals listened to arguments stemming from a
display of the commandments outside Elkhart
City Hall. In that case, the ICLU appealed U.S.
District Judge Allen Sharp's ruling that the
display did not violate the Constitution.
Judge Barker noted that the appeals court's
decision in that case will have a significant
impact on the one pending in her court.
Other federal court cases have barred
display of religious materials on public lands.
Earlier this week, a federal judge in
Kentucky forbid that state from putting up a
similar monument bearing the Ten
Commandments. In a ruling Tuesday, U.S.
District Judge Joseph Hood said the monument
would amount to a government endorsement
of religion.
In Indiana, private donors solicited by Rep.
Brent E. Steele, R-Bedford, planned to build
the $20,000 Statehouse monument, which
would replace a Ten Commandments memorial
that was erected in 1958 and removed from the
lawn in 1991 after it was vandalized repeatedly.
Copyright C 2000 The Indianapolis Star
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COMMANDMENTS MONUMENT BARRED
Judge: Marker at Capitol Would Look Like Endorsement
The Courier-Journal (Louisville, KY)
Wednesday, July 26, 2000
Joseph Gerth
A federal judge yesterday blocked the
General Assembly's effort to erect a monument
bearing the Ten Commandments on the
Capitol lawn, saying the measure appeared to
be an endorsement of religion.
Striking down one part of the new law
authorizing the placement, U.S. District Judge
Joseph Hood sided with civil rights lawyers
who argued that the monument would violate
the U.S. Constitution, which requires
government to be neutral on the subject of
religion.
"I think the purpose of this is not secular. I
think it's religious," Hood said in announcing
his decision yesterday from the bench. "It's
admirable that people want the Ten
Commandments up ... (but) this would give
anyone the impression that the Commonwealth
of Kentucky had expressed its faith in the Ten
Commandments."
The American Civil Liberties Union of
Kentucky, which filed suit to block the
monument, did not challenge other portions of
the law that encourage schools to post the Ten
Commandments in classrooms. Hood's
decision will not affect them. The ACLU,
however, has said it would sue if schools use
the law to post the commandments in an
unconstitutional manner.
Hood's ruling comes as commandments
supporters in southeastern Kentucky are
battling in a separate case to post the biblical
laws on the walls of courthouses and schools.
U.S. District Judge Jennifer Coffman ordered
the Ten Commandments removed from display
in public buildings in Harlan, Pulaski and
McCreary counties while a separate ACLU
lawsuit is pending.
Attorney General Ben Chandler's office is
waiting on Hood's written ruling before it
decides whether to appeal to the U.S. 6th
Circuit Court of Appeals. Mark Pfeiffer, a
spokesman for Gov. Paul Patton, said Patton
would defer to Chandler on that decision.
Hood's ruling came after about 1 1/2 hours
of arguments, in which a lawyer for the ACLU
argued that the measure violated the
constitutional separation of church and state.
The state, by contrast, argued that the
monument does not endorse religion. Assistant
Attorney General Jennifer Carrico told Hood
that the display is intended to highlight the Ten
Commandments' historical importance on law
and that objective people would see it as such.
The decision hinged on two questions: Did
the legislature approve the measure to advance
religion? And, would an objective person who
viewed the monument see it as a government
endorsement of religion?
If the answer to either of those questions
was yes, Hood had little choice but to side with
the ACLU, according to previous court cases
and arguments yesterday.
Legislators claimed the monument would
serve historical - not religious - purposes by
showing people that the Ten Commandments
are the precedent legal code upon which the
state's laws are based.
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Hood asked why, then, didn't the legislature
call for similar monuments reciting
Hammurabi's Code and the Justinian Code, two
other sets of laws that influenced jurisprudence
around the world.
David Friedman, general counsel for the
ACLU of Kentucky, cited numerous cases in
which the courts had ruled against government-
endorsed religious displays and argued that just
because the General Assembly said the display
wasn't meant to be an endorsement of religion
didn't mean that people wouldn't view it that
way.
Friedman said that virtually every paragraph
of a lengthy preamble to the legislation
mentioned God, the Bible or religion. And he
pointed out that during floor arguments, a
legislator questioned the religious beliefs of a
Jewish member of the House of
Representatives and that another lawmaker
objected to mentioning the Jewish faith in the
preamble because it was mostly Christians who
filled the early boats that brought people to the
New World.
Carrico, however, told Hood that the
General Assembly clearly spelled out its secular
reasons and she argued that the monument was
to be erected on a corner of the grounds near
the state's floral clock and seven monuments to
individuals.
Hood asked whether such a display
wouldn't say, "Welcome to Kentucky. Here's
our floral clock. Here's our Ten
Commandments."
Hood peppered lawyers on both sides with
questions, but at one point it seemed that
Carrico couldn't get a word out before he fired
another tough question at her. Hood ruled just
after arguments concluded.
The ruling means the state will not be
allowed to place the 6-foot-2-inch granite
tablet, donated to the state by the Fraternal
Order of Eagles in 1971, back on the Capitol
lawn. It will remain in a Frankfort warehouse.
The monument was removed and placed in
storage in the late 19 80s when it was
supplanted by a new heating and cooling
building. Chris Kellogg, a spokeswoman for the
state's Finance and Administration Cabinet,
said it's unclear why the monument wasn't
replaced immediately after it was removed.
Rep. Tom Riner, who wrote the amended
version of Senate Joint Resolution 57 that
eventually became the law at issue yesterday,
said in an interview after the ruling that the
state should appeal Hood's decision.
Earlier, Riner, D-Louisville, had expressed
hope that Hood, a George Bush appointee,
would see things differently than Coffman,
appointed by President Clinton. Yesterday, he
said it doesn't matter who appoints judges - he
believes law schools and the courts have a
liberal bias.
Riner said he still believes it would be
constitutional to erect the monument.
"I don't believe we have a flawed
argument," he said. "I believe it's a flawed
judiciary that would misconstrue the historical
recognition of our precedent legal code as a
violation of the establishment clause of the
Constitution."
Friedman, however, said Hood's ruling was
correct.
"We believe we have the law on our side,"
he said. "So far, so good."
Copyright ( 2000 The Courier-Journal
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HOUSE BACKS 'IN GOD WE TRUST,' URGES DISPLAY OF NATIONAL MOTTO
The Denver Post
Tuesday, July 25, 2000
Bill McAllister
WASHINGTON - The House of
Representatives followed the lead of the
Colorado State Board of Education on Monday
and urged display of the national motto - 'In
God We Trust' - in public buildings. The
House action came on a voice vote on
a resolution introduced by Rep. Bob Schaffer,
R-Fort Collins, who acknowledged his measure
was inspired by the 5-to-1 vote of the state
school board on July 6.
That vote, which encouraged public schools
in Colorado to post the motto, has ignited a
national debate over whether posting the motto
is an improper state endorsement of a
religious sentiment or merely a reaffirmation of
a belief in a supreme being.
Holding a $1 bill bearing the motto,
Schaffer told the House that his was not a
complicated measure, but an endorsement of
'the most fundamental statement' of the
nation's beliefs. It was the motto and a belief in
God that has made the United States
'the greatest nation on the planet,' Schaffer said.
And he noted that the motto is etched on
the walls the House chamber, carried on the
nation's money and already displayed on many
public buildings.
'This is our national motto, not a prayer,'
Schaffer argued. 'This is the motto right before
us. This is not a controversial statement of any
kind.'
Like the Colorado Education Board's
resolution, Schaffer's is nonbinding. It does not
provide any federal funding for posting the
motto, but states only that the House
'encourages the display of the national motto of
the United States of America in public buildings
throughout our nation.'
Schaffer's resolution was opposed by Rep.
Bobby Scott, D-Va., who ridiculed the measure
as 'drive-by legislation,' hurriedly conceived and
dashed before the House.
But Schaffer countered that wasn't the case.
Besides, he said, the Supreme Court has not
struck down the motto as a religious symbol.
'This motto is one that in times of peril and
greatness, Americans frequently resort to,'
Schaffer said.
The vote came as the House was
considering a series of noncontroversial
measures. Before the vote, Schaffer had said
he didn't expect any opposition. While Scott
protested, he did not demand a roll call vote on
the issue. That could have delayed its approval.
Schaffer did concede that the measure,
which he introduced with the backing of U.S.
Reps. Tom Tancredo of Littleton and
Joel Hefley of Colorado Springs, had been
revised minutes before the vote. That revision
was needed to correct some factual errors in the
bill and did not revise the substance of the bill,
he said.
Copyright © 2000 The Denver Post
Corporation
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COLORADO ASKS: IS 'IN GOD WE TRUST' A RELIGIOUS STATEMENT?
The New York Times
Monday, July 3,2000
Michael Janofsky
Close on the heels of the Supreme Court's
latest ruling against officially sponsored prayer
at public schools, the Colorado State Board of
Education is expected to pass a resolution on
Thursday that encourages public schools to
display the national motto "In God we trust."
The measure would be nonbinding, and its
leading proponent, the board chairman, said it
highlighted "civic virtue." But the effort has
drawn criticism as yet another attempt to bring
religion into the classroom in Colorado, even
though courts have ruled that the motto's
appearance on United States currency does not
violate the establishment clause of the First
Amendment, which defines the constitutional
principle of separation of church and state.
Earlier this year, state lawmakers
considered a measure that would have required
the posting of the Ten Commandments in all
public school classrooms and the observation
of a moment of silence at the start of each
school day. The measure was withdrawn when
it became clear that it would not pass, even
after it was amended to remove all references to
God and the commandments and to
recommend only a moment of silence.
Even after the state measure failed, local
religious leaders took up the cause, organizing a
rally in support of the effort. The bill's sponsor,
State Senator John Andrews, a Republican from
Englewood, said he might introduce another
Ten Commandments measure next year.
"Every time 'God' is involved in something,
it's always tied to religion," said Clair Orr of
Kersey, Colo., the education board's chairman
and the sponsor of the measure. "It has gotten
so out of balance in that perspective that the
establishment clause has sterilized the public
domain for anything that has to do with God."
Three states -- South Dakota, Indiana and
Kentucky -- have passed laws this year allowing
schools to post the Ten Commandments in
larger displays that include other historical or
religious documents. And in Alabama last
month, Roy S. Moore, a judge who won fame
for defending the display of the Ten
Commandments in his courtroom, won the
Republican primary for chief justice of the state
Supreme Court.
But nowhere has the public display of the
commandments or the motto been promoted
more passionately than in Colorado, where
many state officials say the mass killings at
Columbine High School 15 months ago
symbolized the moral breakdown of American
society. While no one has argued that the two
teenage gunmen would have been deterred by a
likeness of the Ten Commandments in a
Columbine hallway, many people contend that
by displaying the commandments and words
like "In God we trust," schools would have a
chance to reinforce precepts of moral rectitude.
The issue has nothing to do with religion, they
say.
"Columbine has certainly caused us to take
a closer look at the relationship between values
and culture and our society," said Gov. Bill
Owens, a Republican who supports posting the
Ten Commandments in public schools if it is
voluntary. Rebutting those who say such
displays draw religion into the classroom, he
said the displays reflected simple Judeo-
Christian values that have been embraced by
Americans since the country was founded.
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"Sometimes we run the risk of moving so
far away from the values that helped make this
country great," Governor Owens said. "The
neutrality issue of God should not be required."
Yet opponents of posting the Ten
Commandments and the national motto in
classrooms argue that those who assert the
words are nonreligious are naive or
disingenuous.
- Gully Stanford of Denver, the only
Democrat on the seven-member state
education board and an opponent of Mr. Orr's
resolution, said the use of the words "In God
we trust" in the schools "potentially alienates"
followers of other religions, like Hindus,
Muslims and Buddhists, as well as atheists and
agnostics. "To promote one religion while
ignoring others with a marquee slogan
trivializes the issue to the point it becomes
offensive," Mr. Stanford said.
He added that he thought schools had a
responsibility to teach the role of religion and
moral behavior in history and civics classes.
"But to do it this way, by issuing a
proclamation," he said, "is not the way to go."
The words "In God we trust" first appeared
on American currency when they were put on
the two-cent piece in 1864 after the treasury
secretary, Salmon P. Chase, received a letter
from a Pennsylvania clergyman asking that "the
Almighty God" be recognized in some way on
United States coins. Chase took the request to
Congress, which passed legislation that
President Abraham Lincoln signed.
Almost 100 years later, on July 30, 1956,
another law confirmed "In God we trust" as
"the national motto" -- even though Congress
also recognized the Latin phrase "E pluribus
unum" (out of many, one), which also appears
on United States currency, as a national motto.
In the last four decades, three federal
appeals courts have found that the use of "In
God we trust" on United States currency does
not violate the establishment clause. But
seeking to remove the motto in an appeal of
the most recent case to the Supreme Court,
Robert R. Tiernan, a Denver lawyer, said that
one of the appeals courts erred in 1996 by
interpreting the motto as "ceremonial deism"
that does not convey governmental
endorsement of religion.
Barry Lynn, executive director of
Americans United for the Separation of Church
and State, a nonprofit organization, said the
proposal was clearly an effort to inject religion
into public schools and would not survive a
constitutional challenge.
"This is different from the challenge about
coins," said Mr. Lynn, who is both a lawyer and
a minister in the United Church of Christ. "In
those cases, the courts ruled that because
money is so commonly used, the motto has lost
any religious significance. Posting 'In God we
trust' in public schools gives it a different and
new use for the promotion of religious ideas.
To me, that new use spells 'unconstitutional.'
Copyright ( 2000 The New York Times
Company
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BELIEFS: TRUSTING IN GOD IS ONE THING, BUT SAYING ALL THINGS ARE
POSSIBLE WITH GOD IS QUITE ANOTHER. OR IS IT?
The New York Times
Saturday, July 29,2000
Peter Steinfels
In Ohio, with God all things are still
possible. At least for a few months anyway.
Two weeks ago, a majority of the judges on
the United States Court of Appeals voted to
vacate a ruling made in April by a three-
member panel of the court. That 2-to-1 ruling
declared that Ohio's state motto, "With God
All Things Are Possible," was "an endorsement
of the Christian religion" and therefore
unconstitutional.
The full Court of Appeals has decided to
rehear the case, brought by the Ohio American
Civil Liberties Union. Perhaps it hopes to do a
better job of answering the question that has
had Ohioans scratching their heads since April.
They see the national motto, "In God We
Trust," stamped on every bill and coin they
handle, adorning courtroom walls and
prominently displayed in the House of
Representatives and the Senate. So why is "In
God We Trust" constitutional, as federal courts
have repeatedly ruled, but not Ohio's "With
God All Things Are Possible"?
The same question may interest residents of
other states, like South Dakota ("Under God,
the People Rule") or Colorado ("Nothing
Without the Deity") or even Arizona ("Ditat
Deus," which is Latin for "God Enriches").
The crux of the matter is that "With God
All Things Are Possible" are words spoken by
Jesus in Matthew's Gospel (Chapter 19, Verse
26). "In God We Trust," on the other hand, is
of less certain provenance, most likely coming
from the first line of the King James translation
of Psalm 16 ("In Thee do I put my trust") and
filtered through the last verse of "The Star-
Spangled Banner" ("Then conquer we must,
when our cause it is just, And this be our
motto: In God is our trust").
In April, this was enough for Judge Avern
Cohn to conclude that Jesus' words represented
a particular notion of salvation, "a uniquely
Christian thought not shared by Jews and
Muslims." He may have been a bit hasty on that
point since the Council on American-Islamic
Relations promptly protested that similar
language "is used many times throughout the
Koran." The president of the Islamic Society of
Greater Columbus also noted that the
A.C.L.U., in its solicitude for the rights of
Muslims, had filed its suit without consulting
any.
Jewish reaction to the ruling, following a
precedent of several thousand years, was
divided, although a Christian theologian
pointed to passages in the Psalms and other
books of the Hebrew Bible expressing the same
sentiment as Jesus' words.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Gilbert S.
Merritt was even more theologically subtle than
Judge Cohn in finding differences between "In
God We Trust" and "With God All Things Are
Possible." The two mottos speak of different
"Gods," he discovered. The God of Ohio's
motto is "a personal, all-knowing God" who
makes all things possible through the "miracle
of supernatural intervention" in daily affairs,
Judge Merritt wrote.
On the other hand, "the god in whom we
'trust' " in the national motto, he went on,
"could be the god of Jefferson's deism or even
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perhaps the laws of science or the cosmology
of Newton or Einstein."
With all this attention to the word "God," it
is surprising that the judges worried so little
about the word "we." After all, the national
motto much more directly implicates the atheist
citizen than does Ohio's. A logic-chopping
atheist could even agree that "with God all
things are possible" -- if there were a God, that
is, which by an atheist's lights, there is not.
Not many Ohioans were aware of their
motto's suspect origins or its profound
theological overtones. According to an
A.C.L.U. poll, only 2 percent of Ohioans were
aware of the motto at all.
The motto has been around since 1959,
three years after Congress got around to voting
official standing to "In God We Trust," which
began appearing on United States currency in
1860. The ruckus in Ohio started with a plan to
engrave "With God All Things Are Possible" in
six-inch to eight-inch letters on a granite plaza
near the statehouse, in the same square where
the A.C.L.U. was last active defending the Ku
Klux Klan's right to raise a cross.
Otherwise, the Ohio motto may have been
most noticeable -- and perhaps most consoling
-- on all the forms sent out from the state's
Department of Taxation.
One can only hope that in rehearing the
case the appeals court does not overlook any
opportunities for public enlightenment. It
would be interesting, for example, to hear a
witness like the Rev. David T. Ball, the chaplain
and director of religious life at Denison
University in Granville, Ohio.
Analyzing the case in the June 21-28 issue
of The Christian Century, Mr. Ball noted that
the state of Ohio had given the motto a
meaning almost opposite Jesus'. "It is a
compelling symbol of hope, inspiration and
stick-to-it-iveness," the state had argued in
defense of the motto.
In Matthew's Gospel, however, Jesus'
words came right after he had pronounced that
"it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of
a needle than for a rich man to enter the
kingdom of God." His disciples were surprised
and asked "Then who can be saved?" For
humans it is impossible, Jesus replied, but "with
God all things are possible."
In other words, this was originally not a
booster's affirmation of God-backed enterprise
and human potential. It was Jesus' declaration
of divine power contrasted to human frailty.
Precisely to avoid that misinterpretation, Mr.
Ball writes, the New Revised Standard Version
of the Bible does not use "with God" but
translates the passage "For God all things are
possible."
The reminder that this phrase is a
translation of a Greek text about a man who
spoke Aramaic suggests other witnesses the
court could call. One, of course, could be a
member of the band of skeptical biblical
scholars known as the Jesus Seminar, who
could testify that in the Seminar's own edition
of the Gospels these words appear in black,
meaning that Jesus did not say or believe them
but that they came from later Christians.
Most important would be a post-modem
theoretician of texts and their interpretation.
Does a phrase like this get its meaning from its
original context or from how it has come to be
used? If Americans discovered tomorrow that
"In God We Trust" was originally a Hindu
mantra, does it mean that the currency endorses
Hinduism?
Such testimony might provide amusement
as well as enlightenment, and it is hard to see
what else this whole exercise is accomplishing.





Affirmative action seems to be the issue which refuses to go away. Since the Supreme Court
decision in the 1978 case of Univerity of Caifornia v. Bakke, forbidding quotas but allowing race to be
considered in achieving diversity in higher education admissions, lower courts have struggled with the
issue. Colleges and universities defend affirmative action as necessary to maintain diversity; critics and
some courts have countered that such preferential treatment for minorities constitutes racism.
Such critics won a significant victory in 1996 in the Hopwood case, involving the University of
Texas School of Law, when a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled
that racial preferences could not be used by public colleges to achieve diversity, but only to remedy past
discrimination. The state of Texas appealed, but the Supreme Court refused to hear the case because it
had not been heard by the full Fifth Circuit. The case reappeared before the Fifth Circuit in June, 2000,
as Texas asked another panel to dissolve an injunction issued by the trial court forbidding the law
school from using race as a criteria of admissions.
A 1997 suit demanding an upgrade of Georgia's historically black colleges and calling for the
University of Georgia to stop using race as a factor in admissions was also revived earlier this year. U.S.
District Judge Avant Edenfield had dismissed the case in 1998 for lack of standing, ruling that race had
not been a factor in the plaintiffs' rejection by the University of Georgia. However, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled unanimously in April, 2000 that Judge Edenfield must
reconsider his decision in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in November that cases challenging race-
based admission policies can proceed even if race did not play a role in the plaintiffs rejection. (Texas v.
Lesage, 1999). Plaintiffs have filed similar challenges to race-based admissions programs at both the
University of Michigan and the University of Washington.
It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will once again tackle the issue of affirmative
action. Both critics and schools and universities await a definitive ruling.
* College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2002.
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STATE SEEKS HOPWOOD CASE REVERSAL
Court Hears Arguments on Auffrmative Action
The Houston Chronicle
Thursday, June 8, 2000
Ron Nissimov
NEW ORLEANS - State attorneys asked
the U.S. 5th Circuit Court on Wednesday to
dissolve a court ruling that effectively bans
racial preferences in Texas public colleges,
despite a 1996 decision by the same court that
said such preferences were illegal at the
University of Texas School of Law.
Texas Solicitor General Greg Coleman told
a three-judge panel of the 5th Circuit Court that
the 1996 Hopwood ruling "was wrong" in
saying race-based affirmative action should only
be used to remedy discrimination, and not
simply as a tool to achieve diversity.
The panel heard oral arguments on appeals
filed both by Texas and the four white students
who sued the UT law school for discrimination
because they were not admitted in 1992. The
appeals stem from rulings issued by U.S.
District Judge Sam Sparks in Austin in the wake
of the 1996 5th Circuit Court decision.
In 1998, Sparks ordered Texas to pay the
students a total of $ 776,000 for their attorneys'
fees, but he said they were not entitled to
additional damages because the state showed
they would not have been admitted to the law
school even without affirmative action. The
students - Cheryl Hopwood, whose name has
been attached to the case, Douglas Carvell,
Kenneth Elliott and David Rogers - are seeking
millions of dollars in damages.
Douglas Cox, a Washington, D.C., lawyer
representing Hopwood and Carvell, told the
panel that "it contradicts common sense" for
the state to claim the law school's affirmative
action policy in 1992 was not the reason his
clients were denied admission. At the time, the
law school had lower academic requirements
for black and Mexican-American applicants.
The four students had higher academic ratings
than many black and Hispanic students who
were accepted, their lawyers said.
Cox and Steven Smith, an Austin attorney
representing Rogers and Elliott, both asked the
panel to award monetary damages or order
another trial on the matter.
Sparks in 1994 upheld the former
admissions policy at the UT School of Law,
saying maintaining diversity was a "compelling"
state interest. He also said in 1994 that it was
up to the students to prove they had been
discriminated against. Sparks was overruled by
the 5th Circuit on both counts and ordered to
retry the issue of damages by placing the
burden on the state to show it did not
discriminate.
The U.S. Supreme Court allowed the 5th
Circuit Court ruling to stand by refusing to hear
an appeal by the state.
After the 1996 ruling, Sparks issued an
injunction preventing the UT School of Law
from using race as an admissions criterion.
Texas officials have advised all state colleges to
not use affirmative action in admissions and
scholarships in the wake of the Hopwood
decision.
Coleman said the panel had the right to
revisit the issue because the state is now
appealing Sparks' injunction.
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State attorneys said they are encouraged by
the makeup of the current panel and the fact
that it asked many questions Wednesday about
the issue of revisiting the 1996 ruling. The
current panel consists of Judges Jacques L.
Wiener, Jr. and Carl E. Stewart of the 5th
Circuit Court, and Chief Justice F.A. Little Jr.
of the U.S. District Court in Alexandria, La.,
who was sitting by assignment.
Stewart, who is black, said in court
Wednesday that he "disagreed with the
Hopwood decision when it was written, and I
disagree with it today."
The only judge on the current panel who
served on the 1996 panel is Wiener. Although
Wiener concurred with the 1996 ruling, he
wrote at the time that the panel went too far in
saying that affirmative action should only be
used to cure discrimination. He said the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled in the Bakke case in the
1970s that affirmative action could be used to
promote diversity as long as race was one of a
number of factors taken into consideration.
The 1996 opinion said that in the Bakke
opinion, only Justice Lewis Powell Jr. took the
position that affirmative action could be used
to promote diversity as long as other criteria
also were used. The panel said subsequent
Supreme Court rulings have said that
affirmative action should only be used in
narrowly tailored situations to remedy
discrimination in a certain area.
Patricia Ohlendorf, UT's vice president for
institutional relations and legal affairs, said it is
likely that the ruling of the current panel also
will be appealed to the Supreme Court. She said
she hopes the high court agrees to hear the
matter to settle growing disputes nationwide
over when affirmative action can be used.
Undergraduate and graduate diversity
dropped at several Texas public colleges after
the Hopwood ruling, but the state has enacted
several measures designed to increase minority
enrollment, such as offering automatic
admission to high school seniors in the top 10
percent of their classes. The new laws have
helped undergraduate diversity climb back to
pre-Hopwood levels at UT, and close to pre-
Hopwood levels at Texas A&M University.
Copyright 0 2000 The Houston Chronicle
Publishing Company
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UGA ADMISSIONS LAWSUIT REVIVED
Appeals Court Orders Judge to Reconsider Ruling that Plaintiffs
Lacked Standing
The Adanta Journal and Constitution
Wednesday, April 19,2000
Bill Rankin
The federal appeals court in Atlanta has
revived a lawsuit that accuses the state of using
discriminatory admissions policies at the
University of Georgia and relegating its
historically black colleges to a mission of
remedial education.
In a unanimous decision, the 11th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a federal
judge in Savannah must reconsider his
decisions that dismissed the 11 white and black
plaintiffs on the basis that they lacked standing
to file their federal lawsuit.
In November, the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that cases attacking race-based admissions
policies can go forward even if race did not play
a role in the rejection of a plaintiffs college
application. U.S. District Judge Avant Edenfield
now needs to consider that reasoning, the 11th
Circuit said.
Atlanta lawyer Lee Parks, who represents
the plaintiffs, predicted Edenfield will reinstate
the plaintiffs and find that the university system
operates unconstitutional policies.
"This is a huge deal," Parks said. "This is
Gettysburg for the Board of Regents. They will
either decide to fight on or realize it's over."
Robert Kronley, senior consultant to the
Atlanta-based Southern Education Foundation,
said the regents need to assess their strategies in
light of the recent ruling.
"It's not yet Armageddon here," said
Kronley, who monitors legal activity in the
South and had yet to read the ruling. "It's not
the best news for the system. But they still have
an opportunity to put forth affirmative
defenses, particularly on the historic black
college claims."
Regents spokeswoman Arlethia Perry-
Johnson declined to comment, saying the board
had yet to read the ruling, which was issued
Friday.
UGA communications director Tom
Jackson called the court's decision " another
procedural-type order in a long string of
procedural-type orders. Some have been
favorable, some have not. Obviously, it's not
particularly favorable to the university's
position, but it is just one step in a long
process."
The lawsuit, filed in March 1997, demanded
the regents upgrade the state's historically black
colleges --- Albany State, Fort Valley State and
Savannah State --- and work out a way to attract
more white students to them. It also called for
an end to policies used by the University of
Georgia that use race as a factor in admissions.
Edenfield has made it clear how he feels
about UGA's policies, saying any racial
preference in admissions "stigmatizes" minority
students. After reviewing the evidence before
him, the judge decided last summer that "UGA
cannot constitutionally justify the affirmative
use of race in its admissions decisions."
But in a series of decisions beginning in
January 1998, Edenfield dismissed claims raised
by the plaintiffs who sued the historically black
schools as well as white plaintiffs denied
admission to UGA in 1996, saying they lacked
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standing to file suit and that their claims were
moot. Edenfield had dismissed some of the
plaintiffs against UGA because race was not a
factor in their being rejected.
Since the UGA aspect of the case was
dismissed, Parks has filed new lawsuits with
white female plaintiffs claiming that UGA's
admission policies favored black males. Those
separate claims are now pending before
Edenfield.
UGA President Michael Adams has since
taken gender out of admissions considerations
but has said his school will continue to use race
as a factor.
In the past, UGA has admitted about 90
percent of its students strictly on academic
performance. The rest were accepted on a
combination of any of 12 characteristics,
including race.
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
November in the case of Francois Daniel
Lesage may prompt Edenfield to change his
mind.
Lesage, denied admission to a University of
Texas doctoral program, filed suit claiming the
school employed unconstitutional race-based
policies. A federal judge found that Texas
employed an unconstitutional program, but
rejected Lesage's claims because race was not a
factor in his rejection.
In a unanimous ruling, the Supreme Court
said Lesage's standing to sue did not hinge on
whether race was a factor in his particular
rejection. "The relevant injury in such cases is
the inability to compete on an equal footing,"
the court said.
"That decision fits our case to a T," Parks
said of the case against the Georgia regents.
Parks predicted the day of reckoning is fast
approaching.
"This is the most important ruling so far in
this case," he said. "It ends four years of the
state being able to fend this lawsuit off through
procedural arguments. That is now over."
Staff writers Rebecca McCarthy and James
Salzer contributed to this article.
Copyright 0 2000 The Atlanta Constitution
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DRUG TESTS AND RECESS
Just Another School Day in Lockmey, Texas
Meredith Lugo*
A school board in Texas may have forced the issue of student drug testing back into the hands
of the Supreme Court. In its only full-scale ruling on the issue, the Supreme Court in 1995 upheld
urinalysis for students who try out for sports teams (Vernonia School District v. Acton). Although few
public schools conducted such testing at the time, many subsequently instituted it, viewing the ruling as
permission. Most schools limited the program to student athletes. However, two years ago a high
school in Indiana extended its testing to include all those participating in any extracurricular activities.
The Supreme Court declined to review a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit upholding the policy. No town, however, has gone as far as Lockney, Texas. The
school board, with the overwhelming approval of parents, faculty, and even students, instituted
mandatory drug testing for all students in grades six through twelve. Although parents must sign a
consent form, families have no choice but to comply - refusal counts as a positive test result and draws
the same disciplinary action.
Only one man in the town has challenged the school board. Larry Tannahill refused to give his
consent for his son Brady to be tested and has filed suit, joined by the ACLU, claiming the program
violates Brady's constitutional right to privacy. His family has been ostracized ever since.
Arguments in the case could be heard this summer by a federal judge. If it reaches the Supreme
Court it will provide the justices the opportunity to further clarify the extent to which children are
protected under the Constitution.
* College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2002.
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FAMILY IN TEXAS CHALLENGES MANDATORY SCHOOL DRUG TEST
The New York Times
Monday, April 17,2000
Jim Yardley
For three years, people in this tiny farming
town fretted that stopping the local drug
problem was like trying to lasso the winds that
blow day and night off the flat Texas plains.
Teachers complained of students' getting
stoned at lunch. Parents worried about peer
pressure at school to get high.
Eventually, after an emotional public
meeting and demands that something be done,
the school board here enacted what is
considered the toughest school drug testing
policy in the nation. It requires that all junior
and senior high school students take a
mandatory drug test. There is no choice; refusal
by a parent or student draws the same
punishment as failure to pass the test, an in-
school suspension for first offenders.
Now, as many other school districts across
the country institute drug tests, Lockney, with
only 2,200 residents, has become an unlikely
constitutional battleground. A parent, aided by
the American Civil Liberties Union, filed a
lawsuit in March asserting that the policy
violated his and his son's Fourth Amendment
rights prohibiting unreasonable searches.
Arguments in the case could be heard as soon
as this summer by a federal judge.
"They cannot tell me how I'm supposed to
believe," said the parent, Larry Tannahill, 35,
whose 12-year-old son, Brady, attends the
junior high. "I believe in the Constitution. And
because I believe in our Constitution and our
rights, you're going to punish my son? I don't
think so."Since 1995, when the United States
Supreme Court opened the door to drug testing
in schools by permitting the testing of athletes,
the unanswered question has been where would
schools, and ultimately the court, draw the line.
Until now, school districts had been
tentative in pushing the boundaries, particularly
because legal challenges to wider testing are
pending in Oklahoma, New Jersey and other
states. But Lockney's policy of testing every
student has shattered any boundaries.
"If the policy has no teeth, there's no use
having it," said Donald G. Henslee, the lawyer
representing the Lockney Independent School
District. Mr. Henslee said at least a dozen other
Texas districts had inquired about instituting a
similar policy.
For Mr. Tannahill, the controversy has
made clear the tensions that can arise when an
individual challenges the will of the majority,
particularly in a small town. He and his wife,
Traci, are the only parents who are fighting the
policy. He was dismissed from his job as a farm
worker, though his former employer says the
firing was unrelated to the lawsuit, and he has
found a threatening note outside his home.
Some people have invited the Tannahills to
leave town.
Up and down Main Street, people say they
do not wish Mr. Tannahill any harm, but they
cannot believe one person should stop them
from doing what they believe is in the best
interests of their children. To many parents, the
drug test is a "tool" to provide students a
reason to resist peer pressure to drink or do
drugs. The debate over constitutional rights
seems secondary to many people.
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"I don't feel like it's violating my rights for
my kid to be tested," said Kelly Prayor, 35, who
has two children and is a teller at the local bank.
"As far as my kids' rights, they're not
responsible. What rights do they have? They
don't have a right to drink or do drugs."
Lockney, which is between Lubbock and
Amarillo, is a tiny spot in the agricultural sea of
the Texas plains, which stretch to the horizon,
interrupted only by telephone poles and
windmills and, occasionally, a tree. The local
schools are the biggest employer, and the red
logo of the Lockney Longhorns, the high
school, is painted on the two water towers and
displayed in the rear windshields of many of the
trucks rumbling through town.
People in Lockney do not believe that drugs
are any worse here than in other small towns,
but the issue has generated attention for several
years. In 1997, nearly 300 people attended a
public meeting to discuss drugs. A year later, 12
people were charged with selling cocaine, an
event that stunned the town.
By then, school officials were studying drug
testing policies, including those in several
surrounding towns. Most of the policies
involved testing students for extracurricular
activities. One nearby town with such a policy,
Tulia, is continuing the testing even as it is
under challenge in federal court.
But Lockney officials were intrigued by
another town, Sundown, which instituted a
mandatory testing policy for all students in
1998 that has yet to be challenged. Last
December, the Lockney school board approved
its own mandatory policy and notified parents
that testing would begin in February. Under the
plan, all junior and senior high students would
take a urine test and submit to random follow-
up tests. Employees of the district also undergo
the tests.
Today, all 388 students in junior and senior
high schools in Lockney have taken the text
except Brady. School officials would not say
how many tested positive other than to
describe the number as a "Texas handful." The
in-school suspensions given to first-time
offenders last three days and require students to
complete their class work in a separate room.
They also undergo drug counseling and are
suspended from all school activities for three
weeks. Repeat offenders face longer
suspensions, though not expulsion.
Julie Underwood, general counsel for the
National School Boards Association in
Washington, called the Lockney policy "about
as broad as it could ever be," saying it resulted
from the "slippery slope" created by the
Supreme Court's ruling allowing testing of
athletes. Since then, Ms. Underwood said, the
court has resisted clarifying the parameters for
testing and has sent mixed signals.
In October 1998, the court let stand a lower
court ruling enabling an Indiana school district
to require a drug test for students participating
in after-school activities. But last March, the
court dealt a blow to another Indiana school by
leaving intact a lower court ruling that
prohibited the school from requiring suspended
students to take a drug test before resuming
classes.
"School districts don't know exactly how
far they can take this," Ms. Underwood said.
"There hasn't been a definitive ruling by the
Supreme Court on mandatory testing or
random drug testing by school districts."
Eric E. Sterling, president of the nonprofit
Criminal Justice Policy Foundation in
Washington, predicted that more districts
would emulate Lockney as more parents felt
helpless to prevent their children from using
drugs. Mr. Sterling said the policy could be a
deterrent for some students but he cautioned
that it could further alienate students at risk of
taking drugs. He said the "presumption of
guilt" created by the policy flies in the face of
the Pledge of Allegiance that students recite
every morning.
"Their sense of liberty and what liberty
means will be offended every time they're asked
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to provide a urine specimen without any cause
that they're using drugs," he said.
A lanky, laconic man, Mr. Tannahill says he
is hardly a rebel, but he fears his neighbors are
too eager to give up their rights. He said that he
had not used drugs and that he did not oppose
some sort of drug testing policy, though not
mandatory. His stance seems far more
libertarian than liberal: he also says that growing
gun control efforts violate the constitutional
right to bear arms.
His family has lived in Lockney for four
generations, and he calls the town "a good little
community." Yet he was incensed that under
the school testing policy his refusal to sign a
parental consent form meant that Brady was
considered guilty.
"I'm tired of letting our rights just be taken
away," said Mr. Tannahill, whose younger son,
Coby, 11, attends the town's elementary school.
"They are taking my rights away as a parent,
telling me I had to do this or my son would be
punished. That's what really got to me."
Mr. Tannahill, who graduated from
Lockney High, added, "The teacher taught me
that if you give up your rights, and you're not
going to fight for them, you'll lose them."
Mr. Henslee, the school district's lawyer,
said the board was reconsidering its stance on
parents who refuse to give consent. He said the
board remained committed to mandatory
testing but was considering alternatives to
punishments attached to cases like the
Tannahills'. Brady has been allowed to continue
his normal classes and activities, pending the
result of the lawsuit.
Mr. Tannahill, meanwhile, is struggling with
life as a pariah. He said he had gotten friendly
phone calls or quiet nods from some people,
but few support him publicly. His wife works as
a clerk at a nearby prison. Unemployed, he
builds miniature barns and windmills at home
that he hopes to sell on the Internet. He said
his sons had been treated well at school, as if
nothing had happened, but he remained wary.
Several weeks ago, the family's pet boxer
was sprayed with orange paint from a paint
gun. Mr. Tannahill said he found a note outside
his house that read, "You're messing with our
children, and next time maybe this won't be a
paint gun."
At a school board meeting in March, Mr.
Tannahill and his lawyer unsuccessfully asked
the board to change its policy. Hundreds of
people packed into the Lockney Independent
School District's high school gymnasium for
the meeting, many of them wearing T-shirts
that read: "We asked for it. L.I.S.D. delivered it.
We appreciate it." Speaker after speaker
extolled the policy to loud applause until Mr.
Tannahill's lawyer was greeted with stony
silence.
"If looks could kill, me and my family
would have been dead a long time ago," Mr.
Tannahill said.
Graham Boyd, a civil liberties union lawyer
who is representing Mr. Tannahill, asserted that
the policy had many failings, including that a
urine test does not detect all drugs. But beyond
the legal questions, Mr. Boyd said he was
surprised at the tensions that had arisen.
"This isn't about race or religion or one of
the things you would expect to inflame a
community," he said. "This is about drug
testing a 12-year-old boy."
People in Lockney say Mr. Tannahill is not
in any danger, though a few concede they
would not mind if he left. Residents described
the drug policy as a common-sense solution to
help children resist drugs. A few people
expressed doubts about the policy, but an
overwhelming majority of parents and students
agreed with Jordan Lambert, a senior and the
quarterback of the football team.
"I think it's great," Jordan said. "I don't see
how we're being forced to when we're more
than willing. Ninety-eight percent of the
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student body is more than willing. Nobody is
being forced to."
Copyright C 2000 The New York Times
Company
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CHILD CASUALTIES OF THE DRUG WAR
Testing Schoolchildren Without Cause
Chicago Tribune
Thursday, June 1, 2000
Steve Chapman
American public schools tend to resemble
prisons more all the time, and the trend is
especially conspicuous in the small rural town
of Lockney, in the Texas panhandle. When the
parents of one 6th-grade boy refused to go
along with a new drug policy, his prescribed
punishment was a three-day in-school
suspension, during which time he would have
to wear--I'm not making this up--an orange
jumpsuit.
Lockney appears to be one of only two
school districts in the country (the other is in
nearby Sundown) that have instituted
mandatory drug testing for all students. While
some schools require such tests for kids who
play on athletic teams or participate in
extracurricular activities, Lockney does it for
every single youngster--and not just in high
school but in junior high. Anyone enrolled,
from the 6th grade on, has to submit to a
urinalysis for drugs, and is subject to random
tests afterward.
This was fine with nearly all parents in
Lockney, but not with Larry Tannahill, a 35-
year-old farmhand who somewhere acquired
the weird notion that Americans should not
have to prove their innocence at the whim of
government officials. He refused to allow his
son Brady to be tested, filed a lawsuit with the
help of the American Civil Liberties Union and
is hoping the courts will find that the
Constitution applies even in public schools.
That hope may not be realized. In the
continuing national hysteria known as the drug
war, niceties like the 4th Amendment (which
prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures")
have often been cast aside. In their never-
ending quest for a drug-free society, many
government officials and ordinary Americans
have come to believe that showing respect for
individual rights amounts to giving aid and
comfort to the enemy.
The Lockney policy is extreme, but it may
be the wave of the future. Most Americans may
agree that the survival of the republic depends
on treating 12-year-olds as perpetual suspects.
We may have so little regard for the privacy of
ourselves and our children that we think the
government should be empowered to
commandeer the citizenry's bodily secretions at
any moment for close inspection.
Brady Tannahill's punishment is on hold
while the policy is being challenged. But under
the district's regulations, merely declining to
take part in the drug test is treated the same as
testing positive--actual guilt being irrelevant.
Besides the three-day suspension, Brady would
have been barred from extracurricular activities
for 21 days and would have had to undergo
substance-abuse counseling, even though no
one claims he has actually used any forbidden
substance. He also would have to take monthly
drug tests, with ever-increasing penalties for
each refusal.
This is a relatively new issue for the
judiciary, since American schools survived for
several hundred years without heavy reliance on
urinalysis. But in 1995, the Supreme Court
upheld an Oregon school district's policy of
drug testing all student athletes, dismissing
privacy concerns with the airy assertion that
"school sports are not for the bashful." At the
same time, the justices said they would not
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necessarily approve other mass drug testing
programs.
But it's hard to be optimistic about this
case. The Supreme Court said the Oregon
program was permissible because drugs are so
disruptive to the educational process, and
because when schoolchildren are involved, the
government has the right to conduct any search
"that a reasonable guardian and tutor might
undertake." Those excuses will work just fine in
Lockney. In that case, the court nonchalantly
discarded the most important check on
government searches: the requirement that they
be carried out only when there are grounds to
think a specific person has done something
wrong. We expect police to live by that rule in
combating murder, rape and robbery--but
somehow it's too burdensome for school
principals trying to control and educate 12-year-
olds.
If Lockney or any other town has a drug
problem at the middle school, it could simply
test students whose behavior suggests a
chemically altered state. Either drugs cause
serious misbehavior or they don't. If they do,
schools should be able to combat drug use by
testing the kids who cause trouble. If not, then
maybe drugs are not as destructive as we have
been told, and maybe it's not worth giving up
our right to privacy to stamp them out.
But maybe it's a mistake to think anti-drug
crusaders prefer a tough approach only because
they think it will work--or that they can be
dissuaded by evidence to the contrary.
Sometimes, the only point of abusing people's
rights is to abuse people's rights.
Copyright C 2000 Chicago Tribune Comapny
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SCHOOL DRUG TEST DEBATE SHARPENS
Lawsuit: A Texas District's Requirement for all Students has Provoked




Perhaps it was inevitable. As worry over the
drug problem in schools deepened, someone
was sure to suggest sooner or later: Why not
require all students to take and pass a drug test?
That is happening in a little Texas town --
Lockney, not far from the panhandle city of
Plainview -- where the school board has put
into effect the nation's most rigorous testing
program for public school students.
Lockney's public school population in
grades six through 12 is included in the testing
pool, and parents must sign a consent form to
allow a test. In the program's initial phase, every
student must be tested. Afterward, it goes to a
monthly random test of 10 percent of students.
A refusal to give consent counts as a
positive drug test, with disciplinary action
following.
Predictably, a constitutional fight is under
way in the federal courthouse down the road in
Lubbock. Judges and lawyers have seen it
coming, as the trend toward drug and alcohol
testing has spread through school life: starting
with student athletes, then widening to others.
In 1995, the Supreme Court, in its only
full-scale decision on student drug testing,
upheld urine screening for students who try out
for sports teams. The decision came in a case
involving the school district in Vernonia, Ore.
That ruling, the National School Boards
Association said at the time, gave school
officials "a policy discretion that had been
problematic before."
A popular policy
Drug testing of student athletes had been
gaining as a policy idea since the 1986 death
from a cocaine overdose of Len Bias, a
University of Maryland basketball star. But it
was unclear, until the court ruled, whether
student testing would be found to be
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment,
which bans "unreasonable" searches and
seizures. The court said that testing -- at least in
some circumstances -- could be done
constitutionally.
The Fourth Amendment limits the search
authority only of public schools and colleges --
and drug tests are considered a search --
because the Constitution applies only to acts of
government agencies or officials. Private
schools remain free to adopt drug-testing
policies to their liking.
When the court ruled in 1995, few public
school districts around the nation were doing
testing, according to the School Boards
Association. But afterward, schools -- and then
courts -- began taking the Vernonia ruling as a
signal of constituti6nal permission.
Relying on that ruling, a federal appeals
court in Chicago broadened the judicial
tolerance for testing. It upheld mandatory drug
tests of all students at Rushville High School in
Indiana who wanted to take part in
extracurricular activities -- everything from the
Future Farmers of America to the band to
foreign language clubs.
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Dissenting judges made a prediction: The
decision "takes us a long way toward condoning
drug testing in the general school population."
That was in March 1998. Later that year,
the Supreme Court refused to review the
Rushville case. Last year, the justices declined
to hear a challenge in another Indiana case to a
mandatory test of public school students who
had been in a fight at school.
A milestone
The next milestone has been reached in
Lockney, a community of about 2,200 in the
cattle-feeding and meat-packing country of the
northern Texas plains.
Thursday night its school board upheld the
first disciplinary decision under the policy -- the
case of Brady Eugene Tannahill, 12, a sixth-
grader at Lockney Junior High.
School officials ruled that Brady had to be
punished because his parents refused to permit
him to be tested. Brady was the only one
among 400 students covered by the program
whose parents would not permit testing.
His father, Larry E. Tannahill, could not be
reached to comment. But he told Reuters this
month: "One of my arguments has been that if
you think you've got a problem with one of my
boys, call me. I'll take care of it. The good Lord
gave them to us, not to the school district."
Tannahills file suit
Brady and his father have sued the school
district, the school board and Superintendent
Raymond Lusk. The lawsuit says Brady "has
not used any drugs" and that the school district
has no reason to believe that he does.
The school board has agreed to hold off
punishment until after the case ends. If the
school board wins, Brady faces escalating levels
of punishment, beginning with a 21-day
suspension from school activities, and reaching
transfer to another school and a ban on
participation in extracurricular activities for the
rest of junior high.
By upholding the superintendent's decision
that Brady has violated the policy, the board
has signaled "they want to resolve this through
litigation," says Graham A. Boyd of New
Haven, Conn., one of the Tannahills' lawyers.
Boyd is head of the American Civil Liberties
Union Foundation's project on drug policy
lawsuits.
In announcing the policy in February,
Lockney school officials said, "It has been
determined that there is a significant drug and
alcohol use (and possibly abuse in some
instances) among students, to a point that
warrants implementation of a drug-testing
program."
The statement gives no details of the
problem but says the view is based on "input
from staff, students, community members,
parents and law- enforcement officials."
Rusk declined to discuss the policy, saying
the school district's lawyers could respond.
They were not available, but one of them said
earlier this month, "The district believes it has a
policy that is defensible."
The testing program in Lockney, the
ACLU's Boyd says, "is at the very cutting edge
of this issue. This district is the first in the
country to enact such a policy."
Around the nation, Boyd says, most public
schools do not impose drug testing. Of those
that do, most confine it to athletes, and "a
handful of others" are testing students in
extracurricular activities.
"Most people understand the line to be
drawn at athletics," he says.
The Tannahills' lawsuit claims that the
program violates Brady's constitutional right of
privacy. A key issue will be whether the school
has enough evidence of a drug problem to
make the testing universal.
When the appeals court in Chicago upheld
testing for every student in extracurricular
activities, it said: "Certainly successful
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extracurricular activities require healthy
students."
The dissenters replied that the requirement
of healthy students "is as true for scholastic
matters as it is for extracurricular activities." If
that is a sufficient basis for testing, then
everyone could be tested, the dissenters
complained.
And that is what Lockney school officials
concluded, setting in motion a controversy
reaching well beyond the Texas plains --
perhaps to the Supreme Court.




Does It Guarantee an Individual Right to Bear Arms?
Meredith Lugo*
With his April 7, 1999 ruling U.S. District Court Judge Sam Cummings of the Northern District
of Texas may have thrust the Supreme Court squarely into the national debate over gun control.
Throughout the past year, as shots were fired at Columbine, the NRA thundered, and a million moms
marched, the Supreme Court remained above the fray. The Court's last decision on the Second
Amendment came sixty-one years ago in United States v. Miller (1939), in which the justices unanimously
upheld a bootlegger's conviction for transporting an unregistered, sawed-off shotgun in interstate
commerce. The Court held that the National Firearms Act of 1934 did not violate the Second
Amendment because such a gun bore no reasonable relationship to the preservation of a well-regulated
militia.
Lower courts have followed Miller ever since, interpreting the Second Amendment to guarantee
not individuals, but only state militias, a constitutional right to bear arms. Judge Cummings wholly
rejected this reasoning in his opinion in United States v. Emerson (46 F. Supp. 2d. 598). Emerson was
arrested under the Violence Against Women Act for possessing weapons while under a restraining
order brought against him by his estranged wife, who alleged he had threatened a male friend, in
conjunction with her divorce filing. Relying on recent historical research (which critics contend has
been funded by the gun lobby), Cummings concluded that the Second Amendment was written to
establish the "individual right to bear arms." He then declared the law at issue unconstitutional,
continuing, "It is absurd that a boilerplate state court divorce order can collaterally and automatically
extinguish a law abiding citizen's Second Amendment rights, particularly when neither the judge issuing
the order, nor the parties not their attorneys are aware of the federal criminal penalties arising from
firearm possession after entry of a restraining order." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
heard oral arguments in the case June 13th, 2000, and if Cummings' ruling is upheld, an appeal to the
Supreme Court is almost certain.
Both sides of the gun debate are watching the case with great anticipation. However, the Fifth
Circuit will most likely consider itself bound by the precedent set by the Supreme Court in Miller
(although this obviously did not restrain Judge Cummings). In addition, the judges may avoid the
constitutional issue altogether by ruling merely on statutory grounds to require a finding of
dangerousness before the federal gun law may be applied to a particular individual. Finally,
constitutional law scholar Lawrence Tribe cautions that even if the Second Amendment is found to
guarantee an individual right to bear arms advocates for gun control are not without hope. The
Supreme Court regularly upholds limitations on other liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and, as
Tribe notes, "Even if one does believe that it does confer individual rights, there isn't any way of
treating it as conferring a right for people who threaten violence."
* College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2002.
464
TEXAS CASE COULD AFFECT GUN OWNERSHIP
Court Will Address Individuals'Right to Possess Firearms
USA Today
Monday, June 12, 2000
Richard Willing
It began as a marital dispute in western Texas
and became a debate over Timothy Emerson's
right to keep a gun after a court told him to stay
away from his estranged wife, Sacha.
Now, courtesy of an unusual ruling by a
Texas judge, it has blossomed into a gun-rights
case that could have enormous impact on gun-
control policy in the USA. When gun-rights
advocates and gun-control supporters square
off Tuesday before a federal appeals panel in
New Orleans, the issue will be: Does the
Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
guarantee individuals the right to possess
firearms? Or does it, as courts have indicated
previously, provide that right merely to state
militias?
If the right is guaranteed to individuals, both
sides agree that many gun-control laws might
be invalid, or at least might have to be
rewritten. "This is a case with some real
potential consequences," says Akhil Reed
Amar, constitutional law scholar at Yale
University Law School. The case, U.S. vs.
Emerson, is an appeal of a federal judge's ruling
that invalidated a federal firearms law in 1999
because it conflicted with what the judge called
the "individual right to bear arms."
Judge Sam Cummings' ruling marked the first
time that a federal judge had interpreted the
Second Amendment to guarantee an individual
right. The case involved a doctor in San
Angelo, Texas, who was charged with violating
a restraining order.
If the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals upholds
the ruling, it is likely to inspire challenges in
that circuit -- which covers Texas, Louisiana
and Mississippi -- and elsewhere. The case likely
would be appealed to the Supreme Court,
where at least two justices seem to favor the
individual-rights argument.
Gun-control advocates are concerned.
"Right now, virtually any gun-control law
with a rational basis passes muster," says
Dennis Henigan, general counsel of Handgun
Control Inc., based in Washington. The group
has filed a friend-of-the-court brief that argues
against the individual right. If gun possession is
found to be a constitutional right, he says, gun
laws would be held to "a completely different
standard" that could weaken
some and cause others to be struck down.
Gun-rights advocates also are leery but for
different reasons. Without a comprehensive
decision to contradict them, the advocates,
especially the National Rifle Association, have
argued that the Second Amendment guarantees
individuals the right to keep weapons. An
adverse ruling, especially from the Supreme
Court, would rob them of that rhetorical
weapon.
"Everybody (on the gun-rights side) is
expressing some anticipation and hesitation,"
says Stephen Halbrook, a lawyer in Fairfax, Va.,
who has filed a brief that argues for the
individual right. But, he says, "I think we might
as well get it on. The law's a building block; you
win some, and you lose some. But the idea is to
establish some kind of right."
The case began in 1998, when a Texas court
placed a restraining order on Emerson during
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his divorce. This meant that Emerson, who
legally owned a 9mm pistol, automatically was
in violation of a federal law from 1994 that
aimed to protect women in divorce cases by
denying guns to their spouses.
In April 1999, Cummings struck down the
federal law. He said it violated an individual's
right to possess guns.
In New Orleans, the arguments are likely to
focus on the Second Amendment's phrasing:
"A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
The amendment was approved in 1791.
William Mateja, an assistant U.S. attorney in
Lubbock, Texas, will argue that the "plain text"
demonstrates that the Constitution's framers
intended the right to apply only to state militias,
the 18th century equivalent of today's National
Guard.
Timothy Crooks, a public defender who
represents Emerson, will focus on the way the
amendment singles out the right "of the
people."
"The Constitution clearly distinguishes
between 'the people' and 'the States,' " Crooks
wrote in a court brief.
The Supreme Court has considered the
Second Amendment only once, in 1939. Then,
it returned a case to a lower court to decide
whether a sawed-off shotgun owned by a
bootlegger could be deemed a militia weapon.
The bootlegger was killed in a business-related
dispute before the case was completed.
Gun-control foes have argued that this
decision placed the court squarely on the side
of favoring a militia right, not an individual one.
Gun-rights advocates, joined by some scholars,
say they are reading too much into the 1939
case. Appeals courts in other federal circuits
have not held that the Second Amendment
guarantees an individual right.
A three-judge panel will hear the case, with
the loser having the option of seeking another
hearing before the full appeals court. After that,
the case could head to the Supreme Court.
Copyright ( 2000 Gannett Company, Inc.
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APPEALS COURT TO HEAR GUN RIGHTS CASE FROM TEXAS
Ruling Could Earn Landmark Status
The Fort Worth Star-Telegram
Tuesday, June 13, 2000
Toni Heinzl
A Second Amendment case from Texas that
could become a landmark on citizens' rights to
bear arms will be heard today by a three-judge
panel of the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
in New Orleans.
The National Rifle Association, gun control
and law enforcement groups are watching with
interest to see what the appeals court will
decide in the case of San Angelo physician
Timothy Joe Emerson.
The gun lobby and gun control groups have
brought in their top lawyers and filed friend-of-
the-court briefs in the case.
After U.S. District Judge Sam Cummings in
Lubbock ruled last year that the Second
Amendment gives individual citizens - not just
those organized in state militias - the right to
bear arms, legal experts on both sides of the
issue joined the fray.
The Texas Rifle Association and other gun
control opponents encouraged him to overturn
a federal law that prohibits someone from
owning a gun while under a domestic violence
restraining order.
Opposing Cummings' ruling were a group of
52 legal scholars and historians and 10 national
law enforcement organizations who filed briefs
in support of gun control.
The case was cast in a national spotlight after
Emerson, a family doctor, was arrested and
indicted for possession of a firearm while
subject to a restraining order after an incident
in which he allegedly threatened his estranged
wife with a Beretta pistol and pointed it at her
child.
His defense attorneys argued that federal
prosecutors violated his Second Amendment as
well as due process rights. Cummings agreed
and dismissed the case. Federal prosecutors
appealed Cummings' ruling.
Assistant Federal Public Defender Tim
Crooks, an appellate specialist for the Federal
Public Defender's Office for the Northern
District of Texas, said Emerson was prosecuted
under the same laws that have cost many police
officers their jobs.
Amendments to the 1968 Federal Gun
Control Act passed in 1993/1994 during the
Clinton Administration bar those convicted of
misdemeanor domestic violence offenses or
others subject to domestic violence restraining
orders from possessing a handgun.
Emerson was prosecuted for gun possession
after the alleged gun brandishing incident,
although a judge had never determined whether
he was a danger to his estranged wife or to
society, Crooks said.
The restraining order applied to Emerson was
a "boilerplate formality," Crooks said. It was a
standard form, a temporary order that is part of
divorce filings in Texas, Alabama and many
other states in which the splitting spouses
promise not to threaten or harass their exes or
destroy property.
There was no hearing in which a judge
reviewed factual allegations of threats,
harassment or any other forms of domestic
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violence against Emerson before the gun
brandishing incident, Crooks said.
"The federal law applied in this case violated
his rights to due process and his Second
Amendment rights," Crooks said. "A
fundamental right [the right to bear arms] is
taken away from you without any judicial
findings whether or not a person is dangerous."
But lawyers for the Center to Prevent
Handgun Violence, the sister organization of
Handgun Control Inc., view Cummings' ruling
as a maverick decision that departed from
Supreme Court precedents and broke with the
"mainstream viewpoint" acknowledging the
authority of Congress to restrict gun ownership.
"Judge Cummings established bad law," said
Ruchi Bhowmik, a lawyer for the Center to
Prevent Handgun Violence. "He refused to rely
on Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme
Court has said that the Second Amendment
was clearly written for a well-regulated militia -
it's not an all-out, unqualified right for an
individual to bear arms."
Gun right supporters hope that Cummings'
ruling blazes a trail for more freedom from
government-imposed restrictions of the right to
bear arms.
"So many people are affected who could be
found in violation of a federal law for
possession of a gun while subject to a
temporary restraining order that is routine in
divorce filings in Texas and many other states,"
said Attorney Stephen Halbrook of Fairfax, Va.
Halbrook is a specialist on Second Amendment
issues who wrote the book That Every Man Be
Armed, a classic for gun-control opponents.
Halbrook filed a friend-of-the-court brief on
behalf of the conservative Texas Justice
Foundation, a group associated with San
Antonio businessman Jim Leininger, a generous
contributor to Gov. George W. Bush.
The appeals court panel is not expected to
rule immediately. It could take up to 12 weeks
for the court to issue its decision, court
observers said.
Copyright @ 2000 Star-Telegram Newspaper,
Inc.
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CIRCUIT SIGHTS GUN RIGHT
Does 'Right to Bear Arms'Mean (Gulp) a Right to Bear Arms?
The National Law Journal
Monday, June 5, 2000
DavidE. Rovella
IN THE AFTERMATH of the National
Rifle Association's raucous annual convention
in Charlotte, N.C., and the "Million Mom
March" on Washington, D.C., gun control in
the post-Columbine era has replaced abortion
as the most contentious issue of the 2000
campaign.
But as Al Gore and George W. Bush jockey
for position on issues like trigger locks and
background checks, the real power-brokers of
Second Amendment law may be three as-yet-
unknown New Orleans federal judges.
On June 13, in a courtroom of that city's
John Minor Wisdom Courthouse, a panel of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit will
hear oral arguments in a case that may boil
down to one simple question: Do individuals
have the right to bear arms?
Recent polls say that most believe the
Second Amendment stands for precisely that.
What many don't know is that for nearly a
century, federal courts have ruled with
regularity that citizens have a right to firearms
only as they reasonably relate to the
maintenance of a "well regulated militia."
But on April 7, 1999, U.S. District Court
Judge Sam R. Cummings, of the Northern
District of Texas, threw a wrench into 20th-
century gun rights jurisprudence with his ruling
in U.S. v. Emerson.
Judge Cummings, a Reagan appointee,
surprised both sides by declaring unequivocally
that "a textual analysis of the Second
Amendment supports an individual right to
bear arms." In the case, Timothy Joe Emerson,
a 40-year-old San Angelo, Texas, physician, was
charged with violating a federal law barring
firearms possession by a person who is the
subject of a state domestic restraining order.
"It's a sleeper case . .. which if sustained
could radically change the manner in which
guns are regulated," warns Stuart J. Land, chief
of the pro bono committee and former
chairman of Washington, D.C.'s Arnold &
Porter. He is the attorney for the Educational
Fund to End Handgun Violence and the author
of the group's amicus brief attacking the ruling.
"To have this issue coming up now, after
Columbine and all the gun violence of the last
year, much of it involving children -- it's very
timely and also a little scary," he says.
The case has drawn 100 amici curiae,
ranging from the National Rifle Association, on
one side, to Mr. Land's group and law
enforcement, on the other.
"The question of what the Second
Amendment means is still open," says George
M. Strickler, a law professor at Tulane
University who co-wrote a brief filed on behalf
of Academics for the Second Amendment, a St.
Paul, Minn.-based gun rights group.
"Obviously, a ringing endorsement of the
Second Amendment as a personal right would
be greeted with a lot of happiness."
Some experts say that the three-judge
appeals panel may not reach the Second
Amendment issues. But they add that if the
court does follow Judge Cummings' lead, it
could be setting up a gun rights showdown
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before the Supreme Court that could finally
decide the meaning of the 208-year-old
sentence: "A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed."
Read the fine print
On Dec. 8, 1998, a federal grand jury
indicted Dr. Emerson on five counts of illegal
firearm possession.
A few months earlier, he was in divorce
court, where his estranged wife alleged he had
threatened a male friend. Dr. Emerson,
without a lawyer, did not dispute his wife's
allegations and was made the subject of a
restraining order barring him from threatening
her or his daughter.
A few months later, he was arrested for
doing just that, allegedly brandishing a gun at
them in his medical office. He was indicted in
federal court under 18 U.S.C. 9 2 2 (g)(8), a part
of the Violence Against Women Act left intact
by the U.S. Supreme Court's May 15 ruling in
U.S. v. Mornison, which struck down the act's
civil remedies. The valid code section makes it
illegal for a person who is "subject to a court
order that ... restrains [the person] from
harassing, stalking or threatening an intimate
partner or child" from possessing or buying a
firearm.
When arrested, prosecutors say that Dr.
Emerson had two 9 mm pistols, a military issue
M-1 rifle, an SKS assault rifle with bayonet and
an M-14 rifle.
In charging Dr. Emerson, prosecutors say
that he should have known it was illegal to
possess a weapon because when he purchased a
Beretta pistol from the Timely Finance Co. in
San Angelo in 1997, he signed a "Firearms
Transaction Record" which spelled out that
being the subject of a restraining order means
one cannot buy guns.
Dr. Emerson's first court-appointed lawyer,
ex-federal public defender David M. Guinn,
decided not only to challenge the federal law on
due process grounds, but also came up with the
novel idea of defending his client under a
Second Amendment theory.
Getting around 'Miller'
Judge Cummings' ruling in Emerson
discounts modern case law in favor of a
historical analysis that starts in the seventh
century, when "Englishmen were required to
possess arms and to serve in the military," and
runs to the present day, in which "there has
been a long tradition of widespread lawful gun
ownership by ... individuals."
He distinguished the case from what the
gun control lobby considers the controlling
precedent in the area: the 6 1-year old, tommy-
gun era U.S. v. Miller, in which the Supreme
Court unanimously upheld a conviction for
moving an unregistered sawed-off shotgun in
interstate commerce, a violation of the National
Firearms Act of 1934. The court held that the
law did not violate the Second Amendment as
there was no evidence that such a gun had any
reasonable relationship to the preservation or
efficiency of a well-regulated militia.
Judge Cummings countered that Miller
addresses only the military usefulness of a
sawed-off shotgun, not whether individuals
have a right to possess guns. "One can read
Miller as supporting. . . that the individual
citizen has a right to keep and bear bazookas,
rocket launchers, and other armaments that are
clearly used in modern warfare," he wrote.
This logical extension of the "states' rights"
position, pro-gun groups say, demolishes the
"reasonable relationship" language of Miller.
Because most of the federal cases dealing with
gun rights cite Miller, gun rights supporters
conclude, the government's reliance on those
cases in Emerson is flawed.
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Judge Cummings continued, "It is absurd
that a boilerplate state court divorce order can
collaterally and automatically extinguish a law
abiding citizen's Second Amendment rights,
particularly when neither the judge issuing the
order, nor the parties nor their attorneys are
aware of the federal criminal penalties arising
from firearm possession after entry of a
restraining order." The judge declared the law
at issue in Emerson unconstitutional, adding
cryptically that "a colorable argument exists that
the Federal Government's regulatory scheme, at
least as it pertains to purely intrastate sale or
possession of firearms, runs afoul of the
Amendment's protections."
He wrote that the statute also violates Dr.
Emerson's Fifth Amendment rights, because it
is an "obscure, highly technical statute" with no
requirement of intent by the defendant, and
because Dr. Emerson was prosecuted without
"proof of knowledge that he was violating the
statute."
Reasonably related
Asst. U.S. Attorney Bill Mateja has been
prosecuting gun cases in Lubbock, Texas, since
1991. The 38-year-old prosecutor says that the
Justice Department's stance is that "this case is
really a nobrainer, and the 5th Circuit is bound
to follow stare decisis."
Dr. Emerson's present lawyer says he hopes
the appeals panel rules simply that a state
domestic restraining order must require a
finding of dangerousness before the federal gun
law can be activated.
"I certainly don't think it would be in Dr.
Emerson's interests to make him a poster boy
for the Second Amendment," says the lawyer,
Timothy Crooks, 39, chief of appeals for the
Federal Public Defender's office in Fort Worth,
Texas.
But if the federal panel must reach the
issue, then he believes it should uphold the
lower court ruling since "no Supreme Court or
5th Circuit case has ever resolved whether the
Second Amendment guarantees an individual
right." Although he acknowledges that many of
his colleagues oppose the gun lobby, Mr.
Crooks stoically declares that his first concern
is his client's defense.
Asst. U.S. Attorney Mateja counters that
neither statutory construction nor due process
issues damage the 1994 federal law because it
punishes only "knowing" violations and that
Dr. Emerson's ignorance of the law "is no
defense."
The academics square off
Tulane's Prof. Strickler, of Academics for
the Second Amendment, argues that "in the last
10 or 15 years there has been a burgeoning of
research in the area of the Second
Amendment" supporting the right to bear arms.
Gun control advocates argue that this scholarly
work has been funded by the gun lobby in an
effort to smooth the way for pro-gun rulings.
Ironically, both Mr. Strickler's group and
the NRA shy away from calling for an
absolutist ruling in Emerson. They concede there
is some valid federal power to regulate guns, in
the words of the Academics for the Second
Amendment amicus brief, to prevent "felons,
drug addicts [and] the deranged" from owning
them.
"We don't want to lose," Mr. Strickler says.
"An opinion from the court that basically says
[we're] wrong is something we don't want."
Opposite Mr. Strickler is Brooklyn Law
School Professor David Yassky, who with 51
other academics, is seeking to debunk Judge
Cummings' historical analysis in his brief. "The
guys who wrote the amendment were afraid
New York was going to invade Virginia. But
that's not what the world is like anymore."
Eminent Second Amendment scholar
Laurence Tribe, of Harvard Law School, whom
both sides cite in their briefs, agrees with a
compromise approach.
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"Even if one does believe that it does
confer individual rights, there isn't any way of
treating it as conferring a right for people who
threaten violence," he says, adding, however,
that he believes Emerson is unlikely to be a
landmark case.
"People are looking .. . for a judicial
pronouncement on whether the right to bear
arms has an individual-rights component.
Unless the Fifth Circuit falls into [a] trap, this
isn't likely to be a case where the court reaches
the question."
Copyright ( 2000 The New York Law
Publishing Company
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FREE SPEECH FOR STATE EMPLOYEES
Meredith Lugo*
Should state employees be allowed to access pornography over the Internet on state-owned
computers while at work being paid by tax dollars? It seems safe to say that everyone's answer to this
question would be no. But the issue becomes more difficult when the state employees are university
professors denied access to websites containing sexually explicit material which the professors claim is
necessary for their research.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled en banc, 8-4, on June 2 3rd,
2000 (Urofrky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401), to uphold a Virginia law which bars state employees from
accessing websites containing sexually explicit material, the only law of its kind in the country, against a
challenge by six public university professors supported by the ACLU. State Attorney General Mark
Earley argues that "[t]axpayers ... should not be forced to pay for state employees to use state
computers on state time to download pornography." Defenders of the law also point to the exception
within it giving professors the right to ask permission from their supervisors to access restricted
websites relevant to their research. However, the plaintiffs and the ACLU claim this provision has a
"chilling" effect, restricting the academic freedom recognized as the hallmark of American universities.
Additionally, they argue that in a world where research is increasingly conducted on the Internet, the
law constitutes a "significant burden."
In its June ruling, the Fourth Circuit affirmed an earlier opinion by a three-judge panel of the
court reversing a 1998 district court decision which had held that the law unconstitutionally infringed
upon the First Amendment rights of state employees. The en banc majority opinion rejected this claim
because the law restricts the workers only in their roles as state employees, not as private citizens. The
judges relied on a line of Supreme Court precedents to hold that no First Amendment rights were
implicated because the employees' research was not a matter of public concern. The dissenters disputed
this conclusion, and held that the law must fail because it is both underinclusive (it bans only sexually
explicit material on the Internet, not all sexually explicit material) and overinclusive, restricting work-
related, as well as non-legitimate, uses of sexually explicit material. Chief Judge J. Harvey Wilkinson III
agreed with the dissenters that the restricted speech does involve a matter of public concern, but
concurred in the result upholding the law because it promotes the state's legitimate interest through
minimally intrusive means. His decision rested largely on the ability of the professors to seek waivers
for bona fide research projects. The plaintiffs in the case have not yet decided whether to file an appeal
with the Supreme Court.
* College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2002.
473
APPEALS COURT BACKS SEX BAN ON STATE COMPUTERS
The Richmond Times Dispatch
Saturday, June 24, 2000
Tom Campbell
The federal appeals court in Richmond
yesterday affirmed, 8-4, the constitutionality of
the Virginia law that restricts state employees
from viewing or downloading sexually explicit
material on their state computers.
The 66-page opinion contains some
strongly worded disagreement even among
judges on the same side of the judgment.
It comes in the case filed by the American
Civil Liberties Union on behalf of Melvin I.
Urofsky, a Virginia Commonwealth University
professor, and five other professors at state
colleges and universities.
Under the 1997 law, no state employee may
access sexually explicit material using a state-
owned or state-leased computer, "except to the
extent required in conjunction with a bona fide,
agency-approved research project or other
agency-approved undertaking."
The decision by the full 4th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals affirms the February 1999
opinion of its three-judge panel. That panel
reversed the decision of U.S. District Judge
Leonie M. Brinkema of Alexandria, who ruled
in 1998 that the law unconstitutionally infringes
on state employees' First Amendment rights.
The majority opinion rejects that claim
because it applies to actions of state employees
in their roles as employees, not what they do as
private citizens. The dissenting judges take the
opposite view.
The judges who joined in the majority
opinion also rejected the professors' argument
that, even if the law is constitutional as applied
to most state employees, it is invalid because it
infringes on the academic freedom rights of
university faculty members.
Chief Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III agreed
that the law is constitutional, chiefly because of
the exception for bona fide research. But he
wrote a separate concurring opinion to express
concern that "this statute restricts matters of
public concern." He said he wrote separately
because the majority "accords the speech and
research of state employees, including those in
universities, no First Amendment protection
whatsoever."
Kent Willis, director of the Virginia ACLU
office, said the law "is a significant intrusion
into academic freedom. ... There is a long
tradition of college professors operating in the
marketplace of ideas, and that has served our
country very well."
Willis said the law's exception for agency-
approved research nevertheless diminishes a
professor's academic freedom.
"It's the idea that they have to ask - it's
chilling," Willis said. "And in the increasingly
fast-paced world of Internet research it could
be a significant burden."
Willis said it has not been decided whether
to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Virginia attorney general's office
fought the professors' lawsuit and yesterday
expressed pleasure with the appeals court
ruling.
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"Virginia taxpayers should not be forced to
pay for the use of state computers - on state
time - by state employees for downloading
obscenity off the Internet," said Attorney
General Mark L. Earley.
Copyright ( 2000 The Richmond Times
Dispatch
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A federal appeals court yesterday ruled that
Virginia can prohibit state employees from
accessing sexually explicit material on state
computers.
The 8-4 ruling by the 4th Circuit Court of
Appeals in Richmond upheld a 1996 Virginia
law that gave the state the authority to do so.
The Virginia chapter of the American Civil
Liberties Union sued on behalf of a handful of
college professors who claimed the law stifled
their academic work.
Kent Willis, executive director of the
ACLU, said most courts have recognized a
need to balance the state's interest with
academic freedom. But the 4th Circuit ignored
that.
"It's a disappointing decision that seems to
show once again that the 4th Circuit is out of
step with most jurisprudence in this nation. It
is a case that ultimately says there is no such
thing as academic freedom and that public
employees have no free-speech rights," Mr.
Willis said.
Attorney General Mark L. Earley, whose
office defended the law before the courts, said
the decision protects the state's interest.
"We are pleased with today's decision.
Virginia taxpayers should not be forced to pay
for the use of state computers - on state time -
by state employees for downloading obscenity
off the Internet," Mr. Earley said in a statement.
The law originally had been overturned by
Judge Leonie M. Brinkema in U.S. District
Court in Alexandria two years ago. Last year a
three-judge panel of the appeals court
overturned Judge Brinkema, and yesterday's
ruling upholds the panel.
Mr. Willis said the ACLU will have to
consult the professors who are the plaintiffs in
the case before deciding whether to appeal to
the U.S. Supreme Court.
The majority opinion was written by Judge
William W. Wilkins Jr. In the opinion, he wrote
that the state may regulate what employees do
when they are acting as state employees, on
state time, with state equipment.
Chief Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson joined the
majority's decision, although in his concurring
opinion he said he only did so because the law
allows professors to seek permission to access
prohibited material.
Judge Francis D. Murnaghan, writing for
the four dissenting judges, wrote that the law
was arbitrary in targeting one type of computer
activity.
"The commonwealth has not explained,
and cannot possibly explain, why employees
who access sexually explicit material are any less
'efficient' at their work than employees who
check espn.com every 20 minutes during the
NCAA tournament," he wrote.
Copyright C 2000 News World
Communications, Inc.
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INTERNET ANTI-PORN LAW IN VA. IS UPHELD
The Washington Post
Thursday, February 11, 1999
Brooke A. Masters
A federal appeals court panel has upheld a
Virginia law that bars state employees from
using state computers to access Internet
pornography, rejecting a challenge from six
public university professors who argued that
the law infringed on their First Amendment
rights.
The three judges on the 4th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals yesterday found that the
professors had no right to call up the material
without permission from their supervisors,
even though the restrictions could affect the
professors' research.
Essentially, the court ruled in Urofsky v.
Gilmore that state employees have no free
speech rights unless they are talking about a
"matter of public concern" and that the
professors' research did not qualify because it
was part of their work as state employees,
rather than their role as citizens.
"The Commonwealth must retain its ability
to control the manner in which its employees
discharge their duties," Judge William Wilkins
wrote in the nine-page opinion.
Ann Beeson, an American Civil Liberties
Union attorney who represented the professors,
criticized the decision in strong terms. "It's
totally outrageous.... The decision goes way
beyond anything to do with" the Internet, she
said. "It should go without saying that what our
professors say is a matter of public concern,"
Beeson said.
But Virginia Attorney General Mark L.
Earley (R) praised the court for overturning a
1998 ruling by U.S. District Judge Leonie M.
Brinkema, who found the law unconstitutional.
"Taxpayers in Virginia should not be forced
to pay for state employees to use state
computers on state time to download
pornography," Earley said. He played down the
concerns about academic freedom, saying, "All
the professor would have to do is get
permission to download the material, so it's not
going to be a problem."
Virginia, which enacted the law in 1996, is
the only state in the country with this kind of
restriction on university professors, said Robert
M. O'Neil, a University of Virginia professor
who chairs a national committee on academic
freedom for the American Association of
University Professors. "It's a setback. . . . It has
very serious implications for academic
freedom," O'Neil said.
The law already has had some practical
effect. George Mason University blocked access
to a Web site set up by one of the plaintiffs,
Paul Smith, because it used pornography to
demonstrate how hard the Internet is to
regulate.
Another professor, lead plaintiff Melvin I.
Urofsky, of Virginia Commonwealth
University, said the law forced him to decline
an online research project on indecency law.
Several other plaintiffs said they needed wide-
ranging Web access to research human sexuality
and sexually explicit poetry.
Beeson said the professors are weighing
whether to ask the full 4th Circuit to rehear the
case or to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Copyright ( 1999 The Washington Post
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A "DEATH WARRANT" FOR TOBACCO COMPANIES?
Meredith Lugo*
In a landmark class action suit brought by an estimated 700,000 sick Florida smokers in Dade
County, Florida Circuit Court which has garnered mass media attention, jurors on July 14h, 2000,
having previously found five tobacco companies (known collectively as "Big Tobacco") guilty of
conspiracy and fraud, ordered them to pay $144.8 billion in punitive damages, easily setting a new
record.
Tobacco attorneys are appealing not just the damages award, but the entire structure of the trial.
Judge Robert Kaye divided the trial into three stages, liability, compensatory damages, and finally
punitive damages, an action the companies have hotly criticized. Industry lawyers also argue that the
trial was fatally flawed from its inception because the smokers never should have been allowed to sue as
a class. In addition, they contend the damage award cannot be finalized until the compensatory
damages of each member of the class have been determined, a process they predict could take 75 years.
The companies also assert the damages award will bankrupt each of them, a result forbidden under
Florida law. Finally, were the case to get that far, the Supreme Court has a history of carefully analyzing
high punitive damages awards.
While Big Tobacco seems confident they will escape the verdict unscathed, it remains a
stunning victory that others will surely try to repeat. The Supreme Court, however, may place
substantial barriers in their way.
* College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2002.
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'FLAWS' CONFUSE TOBACCO VERDICT
Appeal Certain; Payout is Not
Sun-Sentinel (Fort Lauderdale, FL)
Sunday, July 16,2000
Teni Somers
As many as 700,000 people stand to share
in a record $ 145 billion award levied against
the five top tobacco companies on Friday in a
statewide class-action case, but that is one of
the few things they share.
They smoked different brands for varying
amounts of time. They developed different
diseases. And some may have been exposed to
environmental factors that could have
contributed to their illness.
And therein lies what a tobacco lawyer
called one of the "fatal flaws" that should
reverse the case on appeal.
"The most overwhelming flaw is the class
certification," said Greg Little, a lawyer for
Philip Morris, the cigarette maker with the
largest market share that was ordered to pay
about half of the staggering $ 145 billion award.
More than two dozen times courts in other
states ruled that each individual smoker has a
different history and illness that make it
impossible and unfair to lump them together in
one trial. In fact, this was the first class action
against tobacco to go to trial.
Little had no difficulty pointing out a half
dozen more flaws, not even counting the 16
mistrial motions the tobacco lawyers filed
during the last two months of the two-year
class-action trial.
While a brigade of lawyers for the tobacco
companies in Miami-Dade Circuit Court tried
to defend their actions before a jury that last
year decided the cigarette makers lied to the
American public, a coterie of lawyers pored
over case law to put together motions for
appeal that could leave the case stuck in a legal
quagmire for at least another two years.
Tobacco lawyers tried to derail this class
action months ago by bringing it to the state
Supreme Court for review. But the top Florida
court told the industry that it was too early in
the process to hear the matter.
"No legal decision, inside or outside
Florida, supports this as a class action," said
David Adelman, a tobacco analyst with Morgan
Stanley.
Even before the jury began its deliberations
Friday morning, Adelman issued a report in
which he mentioned the possibility of an
unprecedented award and said he thought it
would not have any long-standing financial
ramifications.
While tobacco lawyers are ready to take
their claims to the high court once again,
analysts warned that the Florida appeals courts
are not necessarily a friendly place for
defendants. And they cautioned that even
though appeals courts in other states have ruled
in favor of the cigarette companies on similar
arguments, Florida is a place that enjoys being
umique.
"No question, the tobacco companies have
some very real issues for appeal," said Bruce
Rogow, a lawyer and professor at Nova
Southeastern University Law School. "But there
are a couple of problems with trying to assess
the Florida class action as you would a usual
case. This is not the usual case and the Florida
courts have actually been pretty flexible about
trying to find a remedy for people in mass tort
litigation."
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Class actions are designed to handle cases
like a plane crash, where there is no dispute in
the cause or the level of responsibility of each
of the victims, Little said.
Tobacco cases are different because each
plaintiff could have a different level of
responsibility, used different brands and may
have been exposed to other environmental
factors that could have contributed to their
illness, he said.
He pointed to the jury's verdict in the
second phase of the statewide class-action case,
in which each of the three class representatives
was awarded a different sum of money. And
the tobacco companies were ordered to pay a
different amount for each smoker based on the
evidence of which brands the plaintiffs smoked.
Historically that has been a successful
argument for tobacco. To date, courts in 28
states have rejected attempts to file class-action
cases against tobacco. And earlier this year, the
Maryland Supreme Court cited the Florida case
as an example of why such cases do not work.
Little cited a previous Florida Supreme
Court Case that addressed the due process right
a defendant should have to raise different issues
for each person.
"Law isn't a science, there isn't a single right
answer for these kind of issues," Rogow
cautioned.
The Supreme Court, when it denied hearing
the tobacco appeal of the class certification, was
not blind to what was happening in the Miami
courtroom, he said.
"The court is aware that millions of dollars
were being invested in this case and they could
have changed the terms of the trial plan right at
the beginning," he said.
While tobacco lawyers can cite a laundry list
of mistakes they think Judge Robert Kaye made
throughout the trial, they must meet a tough
standard of review -- basically did he abuse his
discretion and do what no other judge would
have done in the same situation.
The appeals courts will also review the
record to see if the trial judge gave the jury
"curative instructions" in an attempt to negate
whatever damage might have been done in the
heat of trial.
For instance, tobacco lawyers asked for a
mistrial several times because Stanley
Rosenblatt, the lawyer for the sick smokers,
made statements that could have led the jury to
think tobacco could pay the damages award
over time.
The appeals court will look to see if the
judge instructed the jury that a payout over time
is not an option.
Tobacco lawyers repeatedly argued that the
plan for how this case would proceed creates a
mountain of unmanageability. For instance, in
the second phase of the trial the jury
determined that the companies should pay
three representatives of the entire class $ 12.7
million as compensation for their suffering and
medical bills.
The jury then went on to the third phase to
determine how much the companies should pay
as punishment for conspiring to hide the health
risks of smoking.
The two damage awards should not be
finalized, by law, until all of the class members
have their day in court to determine their
compensatory damages, Little said. But the
court has no plan for moving forward with that
process, he said. And the jurors who levied the
damage awards have been dismissed, so now
who will hear the individual cases, he asked.
It's a question other lawyers are glad they
can just sit back and watch how it will be
resolved.
"I haven't tried to figure that out," said
Rogow. "There's no question it is a messy legal
situation, but just because it is messy and
unusual, just because it might not be 100
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percent accurate or fair in the usual sense of
how things are done, does not mean tobacco is
going to be able to escape liability," he said.
Another compelling question, he said, was
where will this all end. In light of all this
litigation, the admission of addiction and health
risk made during this trial by the tobacco
companies' chief executive officers, how can
someone who starts smoking today, who
develops cancer in 20 years even consider filing
a lawsuit against the industry.
Copyright ( 2000 Sun-Sentinel Company
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JURY AWARDS $145 BILLION IN LANDMARK TOBACCO CASE
Record Punitive Damages in Class-Action Lawsuit in Floida
Multrolies Industry's Woes. Yet it Remains Confident of an Appeal
Los Angeles Times
Saturday, July 15, 2000
Myron Levin
The tobacco industry suffered a crushing
loss in a landmark class-action case Friday as
jurors, who already had found cigarette makers
guilty of conspiracy and fraud, ordered them to
pay $ 144.8 billion in punitive damages to
Florida smokers who became sick or died as a
result of addiction to cigarette smoking.
The stunning verdict in Dade County
Circuit Court was several times larger than any
previous damage award granted by a U.S. jury.
It was immediately hailed by industry foes as a
watershed in tobacco control and attacked by
the defendants as a travesty that will not
withstand appeals.
"I'm very happy," said plaintiffs lawyer
Stanley Rosenblatt, who along with his wife,
Susan, filed the case in 1994 and has seen it
through a two-year trial that isn't over yet.
"Justice," said Frank Amodeo, a throat
cancer victim and one of the plaintiffs. "After
all these years and so many sick people, justice."
But tobacco lawyers predicted the verdict
will have no practical effect, saying the damages
won't be payable for decades until mini-trials
for the hundreds of thousands of class-action
members determine who is entitled to a share.
Moreover, they said, the entire case is likely to
be thrown out on appeal.
Florida law bars damage awards that could
bankrupt a business, and Judge Robert P. Kaye
could decide to trim the verdict prior to any
appeals.
Dan Webb, an attorney for industry leader
Philip Morris Cos. Inc., whose punishment was
set at $ 74 billion, said he was disappointed but
not surprised by the verdict.
"The deck was truly stacked against us,"
Webb said. "The fact that the judge allowed a
jury to award such an enormous amount of
punitive damages to hundreds of thousands of
unidentified ... smokers, without hearing any
evidence whatsoever about the validity of their
claims, has never happened before in American
history and undoubtedly never will happen
again."
The six-member jury ordered damage
payments of $ 36.3 billion by R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co.; $ 17.6 billion by Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., $ 16.3 billion by
Lorillard Tobacco Co. and $ 790 million by
Liggett Group Inc., an apportionment that
largely reflects market share. Damage awards
totaling nearly $ 1.5 million were entered
against two defunct industry organizations: the
Tobacco Institute and the Council for Tobacco
Research.
"This is a jury who wanted to send a
message to these guys," said Matt Myers, head
of the National Center for Tobacco-Free Kids.
"The verdict is a clear-cut statement that the
jury didn't buy the industry's line that they have
changed."
Jurors Took Less Than Five Hours to
Decide
But Stephen Gillers, a New York University
law professor, called it "inexplicable" and
"unacceptable ... that a six-person state court
jury should be able to make a decision that has
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such a profound impact on the American
economy."
While stating that he favors the use of tort
law to punish corporate misconduct, he said the
"damages caused by Big Tobacco would be
better addressed" by Congress.
The jurors were an assistant principal, a
bank teller, a welder, a telephone technician, a
postal worker and a head custodian for a public
school, according to information provided by
the court. Among them were one current
smoker and one former smoker, and they range
in age from 28 to 49. Four were men and two
were women; four were African American, one
Latino and one white.
They deliberated less than five hours to
reach a verdict and win release from nearly two
years of bondage in a case that featured 157
witnesses, thousands of exhibits and more than
55,000 pages of transcript.
Known as the Engle case, the first class-
action smokers' lawsuit ever to come to trial
took the name of lead plaintiff Howard Engle,
a retired physician who suffers from
emphysema.
In their initial verdict in the case last July,
jurors ruled that smoking was a cause of 20
different diseases and found that cigarette
makers had committed fraud by lying for
decades about the risks and addictiveness of
smoking.
Then in April, the jury found the industry
liable for the cancers of three class
representatives, including Amodeo, awarding
them compensatory damages totaling $ 12.7
million and triggering the latest phase, in which
the panel had to rule on a lump sum of punitive
damages for the entire class, which may
number as many as 700,000.
"The truth is out there now," said Mary
Farnan, another of the class representatives,
after the Friday verdict. Farnan, who blames
the tobacco industry for the cancer that spread
from her lungs to her brain, called it "the worst
disease in the world. And I can tell you that
three times over."
Rosenblatt praised the jurors after the
verdict as "six thoughtful, courageous
Americans" who "did the right thing."
But they did not stick around to discuss
their decision, after Kaye urged them not to
talk to the press. "What you've done here is
your own private business," Kaye said.
'It's Up to the Judical System,' Foreman
Says
Jury foreman L. Anthony Finegan said in an
interview with The Times that the jury arrived
at the $ 144.8-billion figure by averaging what
each of the jurors thought was a figure that
would punish Big Tobacco. The numbers
ranged from $ 100 billion to $ 200 billion.
"You see numbers like that and they are
unreal. I've never written numbers like that in
my life. It was unbelievable," said Finegan, a
44-year-old Jamaican emigre and grade school
assistant principal. "But we were all convinced
we did what was necessary for us to do. Now
it's up to the judicial system to ensure that it
was not a wasted experience."
Finegan said he and other jurors had a
growing respect and admiration for Rosenblatt,
but he said that the verdicts were not based on
personal feelings.
In closing arguments earlier this week,
Rosenblatt had exhorted the jury to make
history by clobbering an industry that he
described as the world's most harmful. "Never
have so few caused so much harm to so many
for so long, and the day of reckoning has
come," Rosenblatt said.
He called for a punitive award of $ 123
billion to $ 196 billion--and suggested $ 154
billion as a "just" amount. Anything less, he
said, "would be a crushing blow to public
health in this country."
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Tobacco Called for 'Financial
Reality'
Claiming that the combined net worth of
the five companies was just over $ 15 billion,
defense attorneys said no industry--and indeed
few countries--could make a lump sum
payment of the magnitude the plaintiffs sought.
Rather than punitive damages, Rosenblatt
was seeking "a death warrant for each of these
five companies," Webb told the jury.
The verdict must reflect "financial reality,
not fantasy," argued Brown & Williamson
attorney Gordon Smith.
The industry contended that punitive
damages weren't warranted in light of steps by
the companies to reform their marketing
practices, fight underage smoking, develop less
hazardous cigarettes and be truthful with the
public about the risks of their products. They
suggested that if the jury felt obliged to order
punitive damages for past misconduct, a total
of about $ 400 million for the companies
should be enough.
Accustomed to working in lockstep to
defend antitobacco claims, industry lawyers at
times seemed like passengers on a shipwreck
without enough space in the lifeboats--arguing
that their clients deserved special consideration,
based on their efforts to reform or delicate
financial condition. Speaking of his debt-
burdened client, RJR lawyer James Johnson said
that "like many individuals, Reynolds lives from
paycheck to paycheck."
But in the end, jurors gave Rosenblatt
nearly all that he sought.
Superficially, the judgment pales against
industry settlements with the states, which
require payments of $ 246 billion over 25 years,
along with billions of dollars more for the fees
of private lawyers for the states. However, the
settlement payments are being made through
price increases on cigarettes sold over the next
25 years, whereas there is no allowance in
Friday's award for paying on the installment
plan.
The verdict is the latest, and clearest,
barometer of the declining legal fortunes of an
industry that, until recently, had achieved nearly
legendary success in fending off damage claims.
But "their continuing nightmare was a
catastrophic loss of the kind that, at the
moment at least, has been registered in this
particular case," said Robert Rabin, a Stanford
University law professor. Rabin noted that
punitive damage awards often get reduced on
appeal and that there is a chance of the whole
case being reversed.
The award also suggests that the industry's
peace pact with the states may provide little in
the way of damage control against future
claims. With little effect, industry lawyers told
the jury that the companies' annual payments to
the states well exceed their profits, and that
their agreement to eliminate tobacco billboards
and fight underage smoking was benefiting
public health.
In addition to the Engle case, the industry
faces a massive Justice Department suit seeking
reimbursement of smoking-related health care
costs, a string of major lawsuits in federal court
in Brooklyn, N.Y., and hundreds of suits by
individual smokers in courts throughout the
U.S.
Friday's result can only burnish the
Rosenblatts' image as tobacco killers.
In 1998, tobacco companies agreed to pay a
$ 349-million out-of-court settlement in a class-
action case filed by the Rosenblatts on behalf of
airline flight attendants claiming illnesses from
working in smoky airline cabins.
The settlement was controversial because it
provided the Rosenblatts with $ 49 million in
fees and costs, and earmarked $ 300 million for
a new health research foundation, yet flight
attendants got nothing except the right to
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pursue individual claims under more favorable
ground rules.
It's unclear what happens next in the
Byzantine Engle case, though that may be
clarified Monday when the lawyers meet with
Kaye.
One thing seems certain, however: Injured
Florida smokers won't be cashing checks any
time soon. And the likelihood of long appeals is
just one reason.
In remarks following the verdict, industry
lawyers suggested the possibility of a stalemate
that will delay the start of appeals, and in the
process put the pressure created by the verdict
back on the plaintiffs and the court.
Under the law, they said, appeals can't begin
until the trial is over, which can't happen until
compensatory claims of individual class
members are resolved. Otherwise, they said, no
one will know who is eligible for punitive
damages and how to cut the pie.
Given an estimate of 700,000 class
members, Webb said it could take 75 years and
100 judges assigned full time to resolve all of
the claims.
Kaye may reject the industry's analysis and
issue a final judgment that triggers appeals.
Even so, said Mary Aronson, a legal and
financial analyst who tracks tobacco litigation,
"It's going to be a long, long time before
anybody sees any money."
Times staff writer Mike Clary contributed
to this story.
Copyright © 2000 Times Mirror Company
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GUN MANUFACTURERS
Can They be Held Liable for the Marketing and Illegal Sales of Their Products?
Meredith Lugo*
On another front in the national gun control debate, lawyers for both gun manufacturers and
the cities who hope to sue them to recover medical costs associated with violent crime are closely
watching the Brooklyn case of Hamilton v. Accu-tek (62 F. Supp. 2d. 802).
Most suits against the gun industry have involved the manufacturing process, faulting
companies for not doing more to prevent misuse of their products by children or criminals, such as
installing trigger locks. The plaintiffs in Hamilton instead tried a novel approach, accusing the entire
industry of collective liability for negligent marketing, deliberately oversupplying areas with less
stringent gun control laws, thereby creating an illegal underground pipeline through which guns were
sold and transported into states with more restrictive laws. The jury's verdict finding fifteen of the
twenty-five defendant gun manufacturers guilty was upheld last May by District Court Judge Jack
Weinstein who held, "It cannot be said as a matter of law that reasonable steps could not have been
taken by handgun manufacturers to reduce the risk of their products being sold to persons likely to
misuse them." The Center to Prevent Handgun Violence has hailed the case as "the first jury verdict
finding the handgun industry liable for the criminal use of a gun."
However, the industry was also able to find some solace in the verdict: only three defendants
were ordered to pay damages, which totaled a mere $520,000. It is also unclear whether other judges
will follow Judge Weinstein's lead. He has a reputation for being somewhat of a maverick, particularly
in the field of products liability. The case is now in the hands of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, and an appeal to the Supreme Court could follow.
* College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2002.
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BROOKLYN CASE IS FIRST TO PUT FIREARMS INDUSTRY PRACTICES ON TRIAL
The Washington Post
Tuesday, January 19, 1999
Roberto Suro
Gail Fox seethes with the anger of a mother
who protected her son year after year only to
see him shot senselessly while on a sidewalk.
But her parental ire is focused on an unusual
target.
She does not blame the child who
accidentally fired the gun or the adult who
bought it illegally or the gun trafficker who sold
it out of a car trunk.
Instead her rage is aimed at the firearms
industry, and the vehicle for her anger is a
lawsuit demanding that gun manufacturers as a
whole be held liable for the harm done by their
products.
"They make life-taking instruments that
pour into our neighborhoods with no
regulation," Fox said. "They know what's
happening. They could control it, and so they
should be held responsible."
That novel claim is being argued before a
jury of 10 women and two men in a federal trial
here that is being closely watched -- both
because it could produce a landmark legal
precedent and because it is certain to have an
immediate impact on the politics of gun
control.
Fox's 19-year-old son, Steven, who survived
the shooting nearly five years ago, and relatives
of six other shooting victims who died in
separate incidents are seeking unspecified
damages from more than 30 gun manufacturers
and distributors. At the heart of their case is the
allegation that the firearms industry is guilty of
"collective liability" for fostering the
development of an extensive underground
market in handguns through negligent
marketing methods and deliberate oversupply.
A similar charge arises in a $ 433 million
lawsuit against the firearms industry filed by the
city of Chicago in November. New Orleans
also has sued gun manufacturers, although on
different grounds. Several other cities, including
Boston, Atlanta and Miami, have announced
plans to file suits that will demand the industry
pay the law enforcement and medical costs of
violent crime and accidental shootings.
Gun manufacturers and distributors
respond that they are law-abiding businesses
that cannot be held responsible for the actions
of criminals, whether in the illegal sale of guns
or in the actual shootings.
"Handguns are a highly regulated product
from the moment that a unique serial number
goes on every barrel until the FBI checks on
the consumer before a retail sale is complete,"
said Anne Kimball, who represents Smith &
Wesson, Colt and other prominent gun makers
in the Brooklyn trial. "There is no evidence that
manufacturers or distributors violated the
regulations or failed to cooperate with"
enforcement of them.
In several ways the Brooklyn trial is a test
case for the impending avalanche of municipal
lawsuits that hope to reap monetary and
financial awards similar to those won in
lawsuits brought against the tobacco industry
by state governments.
The Brooklyn trial, Hamilton v. Accu-Tek,
marks the first time that industry-wide practices
are the central focus of a lawsuit and that
manufacturers and distributors have been
obliged to produce documents related to those
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practices. Gun control advocates hope that the
revelations emerging from the Brooklyn
courtroom are but a taste of what will develop
when the municipal lawsuits go to trial.
In a ruling last May, U.S. Senior District
Judge Jack Weinstein, who is hearing the
Brooklyn case, said attorneys for Fox and the
other plaintiffs had already uncovered material
"that hints at support" for the theory that "only
the collective action of the handgun industry"
can be held responsible for the shootings that
gave rise to the lawsuit.
Some of that material was brought to light
last week when reams of industry documents
were introduced as evidence by attorneys for
Fox and the other plaintiffs. These included an
industry study concluding that in 1992 the legal
consumer market for 9mm pistols was
saturated even though production of those
same weapons skyrocketed in subsequent years.
The contradiction could only be explained if
the industry knew that 9mm pistols were "the
gun of choice for drug dealers" and catered to
that illegal market, said attorney Denise
Donleavy.
Other documents showed that
manufacturers rarely make any effort to keep
their guns from being sold at gun shows or by
independent dealers who operate out of their
homes or even their cars. Those kinds of sales
are a major source of weapons to the illegal
market, according to police testimony and
industry surveys produced at the trial. One
distributor's accounts showed sales to 1,929
gun dealers in Florida alone even though fewer
than 40 dealers operated full-scale retail outlets
-- where regulations on waiting periods and
background checks are observed more faithfully
than by solo dealers.
An expert witness for the plaintiffs, David
Stewart, chairman of the department of
marketing at the University of Southern
California, used the documents to compare the
distribution system in the handgun industry
with those for other products that are
potentially harmful. The manufacturers of
herbicides and other farm chemicals, for
example, strictly limit the number of dealers for
their products so that sales personnel can be
carefully trained and monitored to ensure that
purchasers get full instructions on the
appropriate use of the chemicals.
"There is a very deliberate effort to prevent
accidents or misuse of the products," Stewart
said, but he found no such effort in gun
industry.
Faced with the widespread use of its
products in criminal acts, the paint industry
adopted a code of standards designed to limit
potential sales of spray paint to juvenile graffiti
artists. Regardless of the effectiveness of these
measures, Stewart said, these efforts showed
that the paint industry concluded that graffiti
"is a law enforcement problem and an industry
problem," unlike the firearms industry, which
he said sees gun crimes and the underground
market as law enforcement issues alone.
The platoon of attorneys representing the
gun manufacturers and distributors are
expected to begin presenting their side of the
case next week, and then the jurors will have to
decide whether the evidence supports the claim
of collective liability against the gun industry.
Collective liability claims have been successful
in only a handful of cases. One of them
involved lawsuits against the manufacturers of
the drug diethylstilbestrol, known as DES.
Those cases successfully argued that it was
impossible to identify any one company that
could be held liable for the harmful effects of
the anti-miscarriage drug, so the all producers
shared the blame.
"DES was a defective product, there is no
claim that this industry is producing defective
handguns," said Kimball. "DES could not be
traced, guns are uniquely identifiable. The
theory of collective liability simply will not
stand up in this case."
In a ruling last year Weinstein set the
standard that must be met if the jury is to rule
488
against the industry. Because no one claims that
the firearms industry deliberately intended its
products to be sold to criminals, Weinstein
wrote, the plaintiffs must show that "the
market is so flooded with handguns sold
without adequate concern over the channels of
distribution and possession, that they become a
generic hazard to the community as a whole
because of the high probability that these
weapons will fall into the hands of criminals or
minors.
Copyright C 1999 The Washington Post
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LAWYERS DEBATE WHO WON GUN SUIT
Contested Result Makes it Hard for Others to Fig-ure What Verdict
Means for Them
National Law journal
Monday, March 1, 1999
Bob Van Voris
ONCE A JURY comes in with a verdict,
the parties usually know where they stand. But
lawyers on both sides of an unprecedented Feb.
11 handgun liability verdict disagree over who
won and why.
Regardless of who is right, the debate is a
dry run for arguments that will determine
whether the latest wave of gun litigation fizzles
out or catches fire.
Defense lawyers point to the fact that only
three of 25 defendants were hit with damages
and that only one of seven victims, a brain-
damaged survivor, got the money, $ 520,000.
And, they say, they are confident that the
verdict will be reversed on appeal -- or even
thrown out by maverick federal Judge Jack B.
Weinstein, whose groundbreaking pretrial
rulings allowed the case to go to a jury.
Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 95-49 (E.D.N.Y.).
"I just walked out of Jack Weinstein's
courtroom, and a Brooklyn jury had cut my
people loose out of six wrongful-death cases.
And I said, 'That's great,"' claimed Timothy A.
Bumann, a partner in the Atlanta office of
Philadelphia's Cozen and O'Connor P.C. He
represented several gun makers, including
Taurus Manufacturing International, one of the
three defendants found liable to 19-year-old
Steven Fox.
Great Guns
Plaintiffs' lawyers and gun control
advocates believe that industry lawyers are
trying to put a good face on an historic defeat.
Looking past less-than-hoped-for damages,
they are thrilled with the unprecedented finding
of negligent marketing against 15 of the
defendants, and they are confident that the
verdict is only the first of many to come.
"However you want to carve it out, this is
the first jury verdict finding the handgun
industry liable for the criminal use of a gun,"
said Brian J. Siebel, a staff attorney at the
Center to Prevent Handgun Violence, in
Washington, D.C.
Mr. Siebel's group is co-counsel to the cities
of Miami, New Orleans and Bridgeport, Conn.,
all of which recently filed lawsuits seeking
reimbursement for the financial costs of
handgun violence. Additional lawsuits against
handgun makers have been filed in Chicago and
Atlanta, and other cities may follow.
City Suits
Lawyers in the municipal cases say that they
are encouraged by the Hamilton verdict and may
borrow from its legal approach. Javier A. Soto,
a lawyer for Miami-Dade County, said that
lawyers for the city tracked the case closely.
Once they finish reviewing the trial, they will
decide whether to amend the city's complaint.
The Miami lawsuit, like those filed by
Atlanta and New Orleans, targets the way guns
are manufactured rather than how they are
distributed. The suits claim gun manufacturers
should do more to ensure that guns cannot be
misused by criminals or children, by including
trigger locks and "smart gun" technologies that
permit only a gun's owner to fire it.
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The legal theories behind Chicago's and
Bridgeport's suits, which zero in on industry
marketing practices, make those cases more
similar to the one tried in Brooklyn.
Marc Elovitz, a member of the plaintiffs'
trial team in Brooklyn, said that he hopes the
verdict will encourage manufacturers to change
their marketing practices. Mr. Elovitz is a
senior associate at New York's Schulte, Roth &
Zabel L.L.P., which assisted lead lawyer Elisa
Barnes on a pro bono basis.
Whether Judge Weinstein's rulings or the
jury's verdict will be replicated elsewhere is
unclear.
According to Professor Timothy Lytton, of
New York Law School, the Hamilton case
represents a shift away from earlier,
unsuccessful cases claiming that gun
manufacturers were liable simply for producing
a highly dangerous product. The current wave
of cases targets specific marketing and
manufacturing practices, with the aim of
reducing handgun violence rather than banning
handguns outright, he said. He believes that
the new approach is more likely to bear fruit,
although tying industry marketing practices to
injuries in individual cases may be difficult.
Prof. Lytton followed the Hamilton trial as
well as an earlier gun liability case before Judge
Weinstein that resulted in a defense verdict in
1998.
While he sees few legal parallels between
gun litigation and tobacco litigation, Prof.
Lytton said that the plaintiffs' political strategies
may be similar: Team up governments with
well-financed plaintiffs' lawyers to force
changes in the way the industries do business,
under the threat of crippling litigation.
Copyright C 1999 The New York Law
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VERDICT AGAINST GUN MAKERS UPHELD
New York Law fournal
Thursday, May 27, 1999
Mark Hamblett
U.S. District Court Judge Jack B. Weinstein
yesterday rejected a defense motion to set aside
February's landmark verdict against gun
manufacturers as a matter of law.
In a 113 -page opinion in Hamilton v. Accu-
tek (CV-95-0049), Judge Weinstein explained
why he allowed a Brooklyn jury to consider
plaintiffs' theory that manufacturers should be
held liable for the negligent distribution of
handguns that are used in crimes, even if the
gun used cannot be traced back to a specific
manufacturer.
Filed in 1995, the suit was brought against
over 30 firearms makers on behalf of families
for six homicide victims and one shooting
survivor, Stephen Fox, who suffered permanent
brain damage when he was accidently shot in
the head by a teenage friend in Queens who
had purchased the weapon from a man selling
guns out of the trunk of his car.
By the start of trial in January, 25 firearms
makers remained as defendants in the case.
And on Feb. 11, at the close of a four-week
trial and days of contentious deliberations, a
jury found 15 of the 25 companies negligent,
found that nine of them proximately caused
injury to one or more plaintiffs, and awarded
damages to only three plaintiffs, including Mr.
Fox and his mother.
While the split verdict left both sides
claiming victory, plaintiffs had succeeded in
pressing the first products liability case where
the product itself was not defective.
Sale and Distribution
Noting in his opinion that "plaintiffs claims
raise novel issues of duty and of collective
liability under governing New York State law"
Judge Weinstein called on the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals to certify "these substantive
law questions" to the New York Court of
Appeals for "definitive resolution."
While New York courts have ruled that
"selling a dangerous product is not unlawful,"
he wrote "there is a subtle but distinctly
different claim in the present case i.e. that while
the sale of the weapon is not in itself tortious,
the method of sale and distribution by
producers may be."
In explaining why manufacturers have a
duty to gun victims to safely distribute and
market handguns, Judge Weinstein cited a
federal study that showed that, in 27 cities
between 1996 and 1998, 51 percent of the guns
used in crimes by juveniles or people between
the ages of 18 and 24 were acquired by
intermediaries who purchased directly from
legitimate, licensed gun dealers.
"It cannot be said, as a matter of law that
reasonable steps could not have been taken by
handgun manufacturers to reduce the risk of
their products being sold to persons likely to
misuse them -- a point which is underscored by
the jury's findings on causation," Judge
Weinstein said.
In the opinion, Judge Weinstein also ruled
that plaintiffs could amend their complaint to
reflect proof at trial concerning defendants'
liability under a national market share theory.
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